The decision of the authority in preventive detention cases cannot be substituted by an objective test in a Court of Law, and the satisfaction mentioned in the Act is the satisfaction of the detaining authority and not of the Court.

PAREED PILLAY, C.J.

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the brother of the detenu T. P. Abdul Majeed. On 27-6-1992 T. P. Abdul Majeed (hereinafter referred to as detenu) arrived at the International Airport. Trivandrum to receive Moidu, who was coming to Kerala from Dubai. Moidu paid customs duty for 3031.6 grams of gold at Rs. 66,695/-. The detenu was to receive Moidu to help him to convey the duty paid gold to Coimbatore as directed by one Shaffi. Moidu had concealed 2869 grams of gold in the form of two sheets, which were later on detected by the officials of the respondents. Relying on the statement of Moidu detenu was also arrested and his statement was obtained. Detenu has retracted from it later.

2. Detenu was arrested on 26-6-1992 and he was later released on bail. On 17-2-1993 the Deputy Collector of Customs passed adjudication order (Ext. P4) dropping the proceedings against the detenu. In Ext. P4 the Deputy Collector arrived at the conclusion that the detenu could not be involved in concealing gold by another passenger who came from abroad and that there are no incriminating circumstances against him. On 18-1-1995 the detenu was arrested under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Grounds of detention were also furnished to him. Detenu submitted representation against Ext. P5 order. His representation was rejected.

3. The stand taken by the petitioner is that Exts. P5, P6, P8, P9 and P10 are illegal, unauthorised and reflective of presumptions and inferences drawn independently by the respondents without reference to the facts, circumstances or materials on record. It is also contended that a reading of Exts. P1 to P3 would really establish that Ext. P5 order was passed without applying the mind of the detaining authority, thereby rendering it illegal, unauthorised and void.

4. As the power of detention is essentially a preventive measure and as it does not have the characteristic of punishment petitioner cannot be heard to say that at best there is only suspicion against the detenu and action taken in anticipation is without justification. In Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. (1975) 2 SCC 81 : (1975 Cri LJ 446) the Supreme Court held in paragraph 8 thus :

"The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters suspectible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the Legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which by reason of its special position, experience and expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based."

Hence the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the detention cannot be judicially reviewed.

5. In Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1982 SC 1165 : (1982 Cri LJ 1251) the Supreme Court held that when the legislature has given primacy the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention, it is not for the court to question whether the grounds given in the order