The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of the nature of the Appellate Authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, and its functioning as a court.

Balasubramanyan J.

The petitioner challenges the decision of the Appellate Authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The petitioner has sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. There cannot be any doubt that this court could exercise its Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution even if the Appellate Authority under the Act is treated as a court. But the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R.1967 SC 1).

2. I will first consider whether the Appellate Authority under the Act is a court or is only a persona design a. Section 9 of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie to an'Appellate Officer' who shall be the District Judge of the District in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten year standings as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. Though sub-section 3 of Section 9 provides for certain matters, there is no provision in the section regarding the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Officer. Section 10 of the Act gives a finality to the order of the Appellate Officer and bars a suit, application or proceedings in execution. Section 15 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of court to deal with any matter in respect of the eviction of any person or the recovery of arrears of rent. Section 16 protects action taken in good faith.. No doubt the authority is designed as Appellate Officer. But that by itself would not convert that officer into a persona designata. But there is a further provision which enables the District Judge to delegate another judicial officer in that District of not less than ten years standing to act as Appellate Officer. The appellation Appellate Officer coupled with the power granted to the District Judge to designate another appellate officer could be a circumstance to indicate that the Appellate Officer was intended to be a persona designata The test to determine whether a District Judge appointed as an appellate Authority under the provisions of a statute would be persona designata or a court was considered by the Supreme Court in the rent decision in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthenpurayil 1995 (2) KLT 205 = (1995) 5 SCC 5). Therein considering the scheme of an Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which provided for conferment of the appellate jurisdiction on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Authority functions as a court. Dealing with a situation arising under the Indian Telegraph Act where the power was conferred on the District Judge, His Lordship Justice G. Viswanatha Iyer in K.S.E.Board v. Narayanan (1973 K.L.T.968) held as follows:

".The District Judge, when that: expression is used in a Central Act means, as per the General Clauses Act 1887, the judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. Ordinarily he functions as a judge of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. He has not been appointed under any provision of the Electricity Act or the Telegraph Act as a Tribunal to decide this question. There is nothing particular in subsection (3) of S.16 also to suggest that the District Judge is intended to act as otherwise than in a judicial capacity when determining the amount of compensation. The matter that he is called upon to decide is a matter relating to the compensation for the infringement of a civil right, namely, compensation for civil trespass that has been committed under the cover of the statute, viz., the Telegraph Act. It is not a case where he is