The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interpretation of a will, the application of S.95 of the Indian Succession Act, and established case law regarding the validity of clauses restraining alienation or enjoyment are crucial in determining the validity of property alienation.

First defendant is the appellant. Second defendant is the father of the first plaintiff and husband of the second plaintiff. First plaintiff being a minor is represented by his mother the second plaintiff. The suit is filed to set aside two sale deeds, Ext. A2 and A3, executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. The property comprised in Exts. A2 and A3 has an extent of 101/2 cents which forms part of 30 cents obtained by the 2nd defendant under Ext. Al will dated 8-11-1952. Ext. Al will was executed by Kesavan Kunjukrishnan in favour of the second defendant who is the testator's brother's son. Plaintiffs' case is that second defendant was given only a life interest as per Ext. Al and so he was not competent to alrenate the property and that the alienations in favour of the first defendant are invalid. First defendant's contention is that second defendant has got absolute right as per Ext. Al will and the condition regarding restraint of alienation is invalid. It is alternatively contended by the first defendant that even assuming that second defendant has only life interest as per Ext. Al that right is transferable and so first plaintiff cannot claim any right in the property so long as the second defendant is alive.

2. The trial court declared the title of the first plaintiff over the plaint schedule property finding that Ext. A2 and A3 sale deeds are void and that the second plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the property for and on behalf of the first plaintiff from the first defendant. First defendant is restrained by a permanent injunction from putting up any buildings in the plaint schedule property and from committing any acts of waste thereon. The judgment and decree of the trial court have been confirmed by the lower appellate court.

3. The question that arises for consideration is whether as per Ext. Al will the second defendant is given only a limited interest viz. life interest or that he has been given absolute right and if so, the condition regarding restraint of alienation is valid. To resolve the controversy the recitals in Ext. Al have to be considered in the light of the observations made in Gnambai Ammal v. Raju Ayyar (AIR 1951 SC 103) wherein the Supreme Court held:

"The cardinal maxim to be observed by Courts in construing a will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testator. This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if he had been better informed or better advised. To construing the language of the will, the Courts are entitled and bound to bear in mind other matters than merely the words used. They must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which arc often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure. "the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair'. But all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by particular testator in that document. So soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the Court is to carry out the intentions as expressed, and none other. The Court is in no case justified in adding to testamentary dispositions. In all cases it must loyally carry out the will as properly construed, and this duty is universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every religion or rank of life".

4. In Ext. Al, it is recited that A schedule property is set apart to the second defendant on account of love and affection and that there is a direction to the second defendant's father that the property should be given unconditionally to the second defendant when he attained the age of 20 years. Specific recital is also there to the effect