The main legal point established in the judgment is that the grounds for nullifying a marriage under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 are exhaustive, and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction outside the boundaries fixed in the Act. Additionally, the judgment clarified the limited relevance of Canon Law in the legal domain of matrimonial causes.

One of the incidental questions surfaced to the fore in this matrimonial dispute is the relevance of an order of annulment of marriage passed by an "Ecclesiastical Tribunal". As we cannot dispose of this case without deciding the said question, we heard counsel on both sides in extenso regarding that question.

2. We shall now state as to how the matter came before us. A petition was filed by one husband for a decree either for divorce or for nullity of his marriage with the respondent. Parties are Christians and they belong to Roman Catholic Church. For the decree of divorce, petitioner alleged that respondent is guilty of incestuous adultery. For the decree of nullity of marriage petitioner adopted two separate grounds. First is that respondent was insane and continued to be so till the date of marriage. Second is that respondent had a previous marriage with one Prince Joseph.

3. A child was born to the respondent in her wedlock with the petitioner and the child is now with its mother, the respondent.

4. The petition was stoutly resisted and the respondent described the allegation regarding incestuous adultery as a cruel story shamelessly concocted by the petitioner. However, respondent admitted that she was involved in a previous marriage, but contended that the said marriage was annulled by the order of the Ecclesiastical Tribunal (or Church Court as it is referred to at times). According to the respondent, the fact of her previous marriage was made known to the petitioner and he agreed to marry the respondent with that knowledge.

5. Learned District Judge did not conduct any enquiry. He took the view that "on the admitted pleadings of the parties it is possible to dispose of the Original Petition without posting the case for evidence". As the respondent admitted the earlier marriage, learned District Judge found that in the absence of a decree passed by the civil court in the manner provided in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short the Divorce Act') the former marriage continued inspire of the annulment order passed by the Ecclesiastical Tribunal. On the said premise learned District Judge passed the decree declaring the present marriage null and void as for the ground envisaged in S.19(4) of the Divorce Act.

6. No doubt, as per S.45 of the Divorce Act, the proceedings thereunder can be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be borne in mind that the said section is subject to the other provisions in the Divorce Act. S.47 of the Act requires a petitioner to state that there was no collusion or connivance between the parties to the marriage. A combined reading of these two sections indicates that the court has to be satisfied of the ground of nullity of marriage (if the petition is for a decree of nullity) inspite of the admission made by any party in the pleadings. Otherwise, there is a danger that two parties can collusively cause a petition to be filed alleging any particular ground for declaring the marriage null and void and the other side can simply admit the same and thereby present an admitted version regarding the ground for nullity. It must also be remembered that if the decree was passed by a District Judge the same is subject to confirmation by the High Court as provided in S.20 of the Divorce Act. All those would suggest that the District Judge is not to pass a decree of nullity of marriage just after reading the pleadings of the parties. At any rate, S.45 of the Divorce Act is not a carte blanche for dispensing with any enquiry as to the existence of a ground for nullity of marriage merely because no dispute regarding that ground has been raised by the other party.

7. In Preston Jones v. Preston Jones (1951 A.C. 391) Lord Mac Dermott has stated thus: "The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict enquiry". The aforesaid observation was quoted by a Full Bench of the