The main legal point established in the judgment is that the denial of promotion to the respondent amounted to sex discrimination, violating Art.16(2) of the Constitution. Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of considering the claims of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in appointments, as mandated by Art.335 of the Constitution.

Mohammed, J.

The main question that arises for decision in this writ appeal is whether the denial of promotion to the respondent, Smt. V. Maniamma, to the post of Assistant Security Inspector amounted to sex discrimination interdicted under Art.16(2) of the Constitution.

2. This writ appeal is against the judgment of the learned single judge in O.P.No.15626 of 1992 directing the appellant to consider the case of the respondent for promotion to the post of Assistant Security Inspector. The appellant is a public limited company, M/s. Hindustan Latex Limited, the sole respondent in the writ petition.

3. The respondent was appointed as Lady Security Guard in the appellant-company with effect from 3-3-1984. She is a member of the scheduled caste. She had later obtained the National Physical Efficiency Test Certificate. Subsequently she was promoted to the post of Head Guard on 21-8-1991 on the strength of her seniority in service. The next promotion post available to the respondent is that of the Assistant Security Inspector (A.S.1.). A vacancy arose for this post with effect from 1-9-1992 consequent on the retirement of C. Thankappan Chettiar, who was working as A.S.1. It is the admitted case that this vacancy should have been filled up by a candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste but the respondent was not appointed to the said vacancy even though a request was made by her in that behalf. However, one Ayyappan a general candidate was appointed. Subsequently another vacancy to the post of A.S.1, arose on 30-11-1992 consequent on the retirement of one P. Andrews. The respondent made a representation to the appellant-company requesting to appoint her to that post. However, no steps were taken by it to promote the respondent to that post. It was in that background the present writ petition was filed by the respondent.

4. The case of the appellant-company is that the respondent was appointed as a Lady Security Guard which post does not carry promotional avenues and that she was discharging the duties of a Security Guard and not Head Guard, which is the feeder category for the post of Assistant Security Inspector. The further case is that post of Lady Security Guard was created for a specific purpose and it is a separate and distinct post in the security department of the appellant-company. In other words, the contention before the learned single judge was that the respondent was not entitled to promotion as Assistant Security Inspector as she was appointed specifically as Lady Security Guard. The learned single judge, after considering the rival contentions, ultimately found that the denial of promotion to the respondent is a clear violation of Art.16(2) of the Constitution. Therefore the learned single judge directed the appellant-company to consider the claim of respondent for promotion. The said finding of the learned single judge is challenged in this writ appeal.

5. Let us have a glimpse of the scope of Art.16(2) of the Constitution to the extent applicable here, in order to resolve the dispute in vol ved in the present writ appeal. Article 16(2) reads thus: "No citizen shall, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State."

This article shall be read with Arts.15(1) and 15(3) for the purpose of this case. Clause (1) of Art.15 mandates that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, residence, or any of them. However, clause (3) of the said Article provides that nothing in Art.15 shall prevent the State from making any 'special provision' for women and children. It is impossible to argue that the special provision for women provided in Art.15(3) authorises a discrimination against women. What is intended is discrimination in favour of women. A provision discriminating in favour of women must necessarily discri