The main legal point established in the judgment is that a civil Court lacking jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction, due to the area falling within the purview of a specific Act, renders any decree passed by the Court invalid and null.

Pareed Pillay, ag. CJ.

Defendant in O.S.216 of 1983 of the Munsiff s Court, Thiruvalla is the appellant. The respondent (landlord) filed the suit claiming eviction of the tenant (appellant) from the building with mesne profits. The suit was decreed on 4-12-1985. A.S.149 of 1986 filed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court was dismissed on 7-8-1987. While the appeal was pending, the area (Kuttapuzha Panchayat area) in which the plaint schedule building is situated has been included as part of Thiruvalla Municipality. The notification was on 31-7-1987. That fact was not brought to the notice of the District Judge.

2. Contention of the appellant is that at the time when the judgment and decree were confirmed by the lower appellate Court the District Judge lacked jurisdiction in disposing of the matter by confirming the decree and so it is a nullity. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it cannot be said that the decree is a nullity and at best appellant can raise his objection when the decree is sought to be executed on the ground that proceedings for eviction of the tenant can be initiated only under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

3. It may be open to the appellant to raise the contention that notwithstanding the judgment and decree the respondent-landlord can proceed only under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act). But the moot question that arises for consideration is whether the decree passed in favour of the respondent is a nullity in view of the fact that at the time when the decree was confirmed by the lower appellate court the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to try the suit.

4. In Narayanan v. Ratnamma [1987 (2) KLT 473] Justice Kochu Thommen (as he then was) held that in a case where the Act has been made applicable to the area in question while the appeal is pending the decree has become incapable of being affirmed since it has become invalid. In the said decision it has been held that when such a decree is challenged it is not only not executable, but is liable to be set aside as invalid and that where the decree has been challenged and the appeal remains pending after the statutory prohibition came into force in the area in question, the decree has become incapable of being affirmed because it has become invalid and therefore it is not merely not executable, but invalid. This decision has been over-ruled in Gourikutty Amma v. Kesavan [1988 (1) KLT 649] where a Division Bench of this Court held thus:

"S.11(1) of the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction. The only prohibition is that such a decree could be executed only in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Even now the provisions of Act 2/65 are not made applicable to the entire State. If the Act itself is repealed the decree of the civil Court can be executed. Therefore it may not be correct to say that as soon as the Act 2/65 is made applicable to the building, the earlier decree for eviction obtained by the landlord would become invalid".

In view of the contention of the appellant that the Bench decision of this Court cannot be sustained in view of the decision in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [(1990) 1 SCC 193], the case was referred for a decision by a Larger Bench of this Court.

5. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [(1990) 1 SCC 193] the Supreme Court held that where civil Court having no jurisdiction passed a decree it is a nullity, that the tenant can raise his objection to the decree even at the stage of execution of the decree and that the decree would not operate as res judicata. In M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (AIR 1991 SC 1094) the Supreme Court held that any suit instituted by the landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the ambit of the Act (obviously referring to the Rent C