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1994 Supreme(Ker) 382

Judges : K.T.THOMAS,N.DHINAKAR
Michael - Appellant
Versus
Victor - Respondent
Case No : A.F.A. No. 74 of 1993
Decided On : 12/20/1994
Advocates Appeared :
Joseph A Vadakkel For Appellant Joseph Franklin For Respondents

The central legal point established in the judgment is the application of the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the court's interpretation of the doctrine's applicability to a release deed affecting property rights.

Headnote:

feeding the grant by estoppels - Property Dispute - Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 43 - The court discussed the application of the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' in the context of a release deed affecting the rights of the appellant in a property dispute. The court interpreted Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and its application to the release deed, emphasizing that the doctrine would apply even if the grantor had only a limited right in the property. The court also referred to relevant case law to support its interpretation.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, one of the children of Joseph and Victoria, was involved in a property dispute regarding a suit property inherited from his parents. The dispute arose from a release deed (Ext. B7) executed by the appellant, affecting his rights in the property.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the release deed (Ext. B7) executed by the appellant effectively transferred all his rights in the suit property to another party. The court held that the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' applied, estopping the appellant from claiming any right in the suit property after the execution of the release deed.

Issues: The main issue was the extent to which the appellant's rights in the suit property were affected by the release deed (Ext. B7) and the application of the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' in the context of the appellant's claim to his remaining share in the property.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and relevant case law, emphasizing the applicability of the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' even when the grantor had only a limited right in the property. The court also considered the nature of the release deed and its effect as a conveyance of property rights.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the release deed (Ext. B7) effectively transferred all the appellant's rights in the suit property, and the doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' applied, estopping the appellant from claiming any right in the property thereafter.

Judgment :-

Thomas, J.

How far the pristine doctrine "feeding the grant by estoppels" would apply to the facts of this case, is the question of law which arises in this appeal. Appellant herein was the second defendant in the suit. He is aggrieved by the decision of the learned single judge who dismissed his first appeal.

2. The facts can be succinctly stated as follows: Appellant is one of the seven children of one Joseph and his wife Victoria. The suit property (situate at Fort Cochin) belonged to the said Joseph and his brother one Rev. Fr. Wilson (who was the first defendant in the suit) as they inherited it from their father. In the year 1969 the said Joseph and Rev. Fr. Wilson together executed a settlement deed (Ext. Al ) as per which the suit property was gifted in favour of Victoria. But after Victoria's death in 1978 a deed of revocation was executed jointly by Joseph and his brother Rev. Fr. Wilson in the year 1979 (Ext. B4). Thereafter, Rev. Fr. Wilson alone transferred all his rights in the suit property (as per Ext. B5) in favour of Columbus (one of the sons of Joseph and Victoria - who is the third defendant in the suit). Almost a year later, the appellant (who was arrayed as the second defendant in the trial court)executed an instrument styling it as release deed (Ext. B7) as per which all the rights of the appellant were transferred to Columbus.

3. It was in the above background that a suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff (who was another son of Joseph and Victoria). The position reached with the decision of the learned single judge in the first appeal is the following: Ext. B4 revocation deed was held to be of no legal validity and hence the gift in favour of Victoria remained valid. So all the seven children of Victoria became jointly entitled to the suit property on the death of Victoria. The preliminary decree was, therefore, granted to the plaintiff declaring his I/ 7th right in the suit property. However, learned single judge observed that appellant's right of I/ 7th share will be subject to Ext. B7 release deed.

4. Grievance of the appellant now is that learned single judge has not specified the extent of erosion of his rights affected by Ext. B7. According to the appellant, Ext. B7 release deed could not have impaired his rights beyond his 1/14th share in the suit property because when Ext. B7 was executed, everybody including himself thought that he had only 1/14th right in the property. It was so thought on the premise that Ext. Al gift deed did not come to reality and it remained revoked. But when that premise was knocked off, his remaining 1/14th share surfaced to the fore and he got a right to have that share separated in the partition.

5. The question of law is, therefore, formulated on the following premise: Ext. B7 was executed by the appellant under the impression that he had only 1/14th share in the property which he inherited as one of the sons of his father and hence Ext. B7 release deed has not affected his remaining 1/14th share which he inherited as heir of his mother Victoria. This, according to the appellant, is because Victoria became the

sole owner of the suit property with the resuscitated gift deed (Ext. A1) and on her death appellant became entitled to 1/7th share and hence he is now entitled to 1/14th share since the other 1/14th share was given away by Ext. B7.

6. Before we consider the above aspect, we may observe that Ext. B7 is an out right release of all his rights in the suit property as on the date of the document. The recitals in the deed are clear enough to indicate that the executant intended to release all his right, title and interest in the suit property hook, line and sinker. In Ext. B7 deed appellant had acknowledged receipt of a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- from the third defendant while releasing his rights in the property and he further reiterated that the entire rights of the executant had been made over to the execute bell, book and candle.

7. S.43 of the T









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