The main legal point established in the judgment is that the definition of 'owner' under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 includes both the registered owner and the person in lawful possession of the vehicle under certain agreements, and the liability to ensure the vehicle is used in accordance with the permit extends to both parties.

Thomas, J.

Appellant claims to be the owner of a goods vehicle (lorry). He applied for a goods carriage permit before the Regional Transport Authority (for short'the rta') concerned, but the said authority did not grant the permit. He, therefore, filed the Original Petition for a writ of mandamus directing the RTA to grant the permit. Learned single judge before whom the Original Petition came up, dismissed it on the ground that as the appellant is not the registered owner of the vehicle he is not entitled to get a permit. This appeal is against the said judgment.

2. According to the appellant, the lorry (KRD 457) belonged to one C.P.K. Balan (who is the registered owner of the vehicle even now) who transferred the vehicle to another person and from the latter it was purchased by the appellant. The first owner C.P.K.Balan had entered into a Hire Purchase Agreement with a financier. The hire purchase liability was taken over by the purchaser of the vehicle and according to the appellant he had cleared the said liability and insisted on the financier to issue a clearance certificate. A goods carriage permit was earlier issued by the RTA in respect of the vehicle, but its period expired on 19-8-1993. Appellant then'made Ext. P3 application for a goods carriage permit. But the second respondent took a stand that the permit could be issued only after transfer of registration of the vehicle in the name of the appellant. Due to some snag, the transfer of registration has not taken place till now. Original Petition was, therefore, filed by the appellant for directing the RTA to grant the permit.

3. Appellant contended that under S.66(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short'the act) it is not necessary that the applicant for a permit should necessarily be the registered owner of the vehicle. Any one in lawful possession of the vehicle, even if he is not a registered owner, can be the holder of a permit, according to the learned counsel. Appellant relied on the decision of a single judge of this Court reported in Dakshayani v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1990 (2) KLT 885) to support his claim.

4. Jagannadha Raju, J., who heard the Original Petition as a Single Judge, did not agree with the view of Dakshayani's case. His Lordship dismissed the Original Petition by dissenting from the reasoning adopted in Dakshayani's case and observed thus:

"In my humble opinion, by process of interpretation, the learned judge was obliterating the effect of the legislative change when the word "owner" is defined in a particular manner by the new statute and when mat definition is totally different from the earlier definition under S.2(19) of the old Motor Vehicles act in my considered opinion, the process of reasoning adopted by the learned judge and his conclusion are not proper. The statement of the law is not correct it does violence to the language of the new definition".

5. Counsel for the appellant has rightly contended mat the approach made by the learned single judge in discarding the reasoning of another single judge, without referring the case to a Division Bench, was contrary to the well established norms and conventions for the comity of Judges. While we refrain from making any observation regarding the strong words employed and used by Jagannadha Raju, J. in criticizing the judgment of the single judge in Dakshayani's case (cited supra) we are of the considered opinion that if the learned judge had doubted the correctness of the interpretation of S.66(1) of the Act made in Dakshayani's case, the question should have been referred to a Division Bench. Salmond in his celebrated treatise on "Jurisprudence" has exhorted that the said norm should be followed, (pages 147 and 158 of the Twelfth Edition). If two single judges decided differently on the same question of law its effect would be to infuse confusion. In Shridhar v. Nagar Palika (AIR 1990 SC 307) Supreme Court pointed out that "it is well-settled principle of judicial