The court established that the government and the Devaswom Board did not have the power of review of their own orders, and interpreted the rules to restrict the reversion to a period of six months and determine the effective date of the reversion.

Jagannadha Rao, C.J.

This appeal is preferred by the writ petitioner, who was working as a Superintendent in the Travancore Devaswom Board. At the time when the suspension order was passed, she was working as an Assistant Commissioner incharge of a sub-group of temples at Neyyattinkara. There were 82 temples in this sub-group. On account of certain alleged irregularities, appellant was kept under suspension on the ground of lack of supervision which resulted in misappropriation by head clerk, Karthiyayani. An inquiry was conducted on 30-11-1991, but the appellant was reinstated in service pending inquiry. Thereafter, pursuant to certain directions in an earlier writ petition, the appellant was served with a show cause notice as to why she should not be removed from service. Appellant submitted a detailed reply. Thereafter, Ext.P6 order was passed on 19-12-1992 reverting the appellant to the post of junior-most Junior Superintendent. This order was questioned in the present writ petition out which this appeal arises. In CMP 30481 of 1992 stay of reversion was granted.

2. During the pendency of the present writ petition, respondents have reviewed Ext.P6 order and passed Ext.P8 order on 7-1-1993. By Ext.P8 order, appellant was reverted for a period of five years with effect from 3-6-1991. Both Exts.P6 and P8 were challenged in the writ petition.

3. So far as Ext.P6 is concerned, the learned single judge came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to deal with it inasmuch as it was superseded by Ext.P8. The learned judge then considered the validity of Ext.P8 and held that the respondents did not have the power of review and, therefore, quashed the same. Having thus quashed Ext.P8, the learned judge directed respondents to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the above said judgment, writ petitioner has filed this appeal.

4. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the original order of punishment, Ext.P6, reverting the appellant to the post of junior-most Junior Superintendent was bad inasmuch as such a punishment could not have been levied under the Rules and punishment of reversion, if any, could have been only for a period of six months. It is also contended that if Ext.PS is without jurisdiction, there is no question of now remitting the matter to the authorities for a fresh reconsideration of the matter. According to the learned counsel, all that could be done was to modify the rig our of Ext., P6 and confine the reversion to six months as permitted by the Rules.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel relied upon Rule 34 of the Kerala Civil Services (CC & A) Rules which, as being applicable to the facts of the case. Though the heading of R.34 is "State Government's, power to review", the body of R.34 shows that the review here could be of any original order or order on appeal passed by a "subordinate authority". R.34 reads as follows, in so far as it is relevant for the present case:

"34. State Government's power to review: -Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government may, on their own motion or otherwise after calling for the records of the case, review ... any original order or order of appeal passed by a subordinate authority under these rules or the rules repealed by R.39 and after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary:

(a) Confirm, modify or set aside the order;

(b) Impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order;

(c) Remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or

(d) Pass such other order as they deem fit; provided "

In our view, the above said Rule did not confer any power of review, which would entitle the Government to review its own orders. Likewise, the Devaswom Board, therefore, would not have any power of review of i