The main legal point established in the judgment is that the power to suspend a government servant lies with specific authorities as per the rules, and any other interpretation would undermine the protection against illegal suspension provided to government servants.

Six District Supply Officers working in various districts have been placed under suspension by Ext. P1 order da ted 4-2-93 passed by the Directorof Civil Supplies(for short the Director), This order is purported to have been passed under rule 10(2) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, 1960 (for short the rules). Petitioners challenge the impugned order.

2. The main attack against Ext. P1 suspension order is that the Director, who passed the impugned order has no authority under Rule 10 of the Rules. It is contended that the Director is not empowered by the Government under Rule 10 of the Rules.

3. The Director has filed a counter-affidavit contending that he has been empowered under Rule 10(2) of the Rules to pass an order of suspension against the District Supply Officers. Rule 10(1) reads:

"10. Suspension. - (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf may at any time place a Government servant under suspension".

Rule 10(2) reads:

"Where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the Appointing Authority, the circumstances in which the order was made".

A plain reading of Rule 10(1) shows that cither the appointing authority or arry authority superior to the appointing authority or any other authority empowered by the Government alone can place a Government servant under suspension. In the instant case as regards the District Supply Officers admittedly the Government is the appointing authority. So there cannot be any superior authority by whom the powers under S.10(1) could be exercised. So the next question is whether there is any authority specifically empowered by the Government under Rule 10(1) of the Rules. In the counter affidavit filed by the Director it is not specifically mentioned that he has been empowered by the Government to place District Supply Officer under suspension.

4. The learned Addl. Advocate General contended that the Director being an authority lower than the appointing authority under Rule 10(2) of the Rules, he has got power to suspend the District Supply Officers and the only condition precedent is that he shall forthwith report the matter to the appointing authority. I do not think that Rule 10(2) gives any such power to the Director. Rule 10(2) is only procedural in nature and when an authority lower than the appointing authority by virtue of hi:; power under Rule 10(1) exercised that power, he should forthwith report the matter to the appointing authority. It was contended that in Rule 10(2) the words "empowered authority" are not mentioned and therefore the power could be exercised by any authority lower than the appointing authority. I am unable to accept this contention. Rule 10 is a safeguard given to the Government servants that they shall not be placed under suspension by incompetent authorities. So the suspension order could only be passed either by the appointing authority or authority superior to the appointing authority or by any other authority specially empowered by the Government. Any other interpretation given to Rule 10(1) would only drive a coach and horse through the very protection given to governments various against illegal suspension. Going by the Rules the Directorof Civil Supplies had no authority to pass Ext. P1 order.

mnjhuy76 The impugned order has been passed pending enquiry. The counsel for the petitioners also brought to my notice that the Director is not the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the District Supply Officers. So the Disciplinary proceedings also could not have been initiated against these petitioners by the Director.

6. Detailed contentions have been raised in all these original petitions regarding the factual situation leading to the suspension and it is contended that there were no reasons or circumstances warranting the suspension of th