The main legal point established in the judgment is the application and interpretation of S.14(1) and S.14(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to determine the exclusion of time during which a previous suit was pending for computing the period of limitation for a subsequent suit.

Plaintiff is the appellant. She filed the suit for specific performance of an oral agreement by the first defendant to sell the plaintiff schedule property to her. The agreement was on 12-3-1978 for a consideration of Rs. 9000/- of which an amount of Rs. 1000/- was paid as advance though according to the first defendant the consideration was Rs. 10,000/-. The plaintiff's case is that she was put in possession of the property, though this is not admitted by the first defendant. The first defendant endorsed in the application made by the plaintiff to the second defendant for loan that she was willing to sell the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff who belongs to the Scheduled Caste community alleges that the agreement was to complete the sale as and when the to an she had applied for from the second defendant was sanctioned to her. A loan of Rs.5000/- was sanctioned on 6-10-1979, but the first defendant was attempting to sell the property to strangers when the plaintiff filed the suit O.S. No. 28 of 1981 in the Munsiffs Court, Haripad for an injunction restraining the first defendant from selling the property to any one other than the plaintiff. An order of temporary injunction Ext. Al was-passed on 3-7-1981. This was challenged in appeal in the District Court, Mavelikara by the first defendant. The District Court confirmed the order of injunction by the order Ext. B2 dated 30-11-1983. At the same time the court held that such an order of injunction could not be issued unconditionally, in view of the fact that the first defendant could not be restrained for ever from alienating the property to anyone other than the plaintiff. Such an indefinite restraint was not proper, and therefore the suit itself was prima facie not entertainable, as one merely for an injunction without a prayer for specific performance. Plaintiff had therefore to amend the plaint suitably. Therefore and while disposing of the appeal the learned District Judge made the injunction subject to the condition that the plaintiff amended the plaint suitably within two months from 16-2-1984 and took follow up action thereafter for prosecuting the suit for the decree that may be passed under the said amendment. Parties were directed to appear in the lower court on 16-2-1984. Plaintiff thereafter instituted the present suit O.S. No. 29 of 1984 on 16-2-1984 for a decree of specific performance of the agreement. So far as O.S. No. 28 of 1981 was concerned he sought leave to withdraw the said suit by filing Application Ext. A3 on 16-2-1984 which was allowed by the order Ext. A4 dated 19-7-1984 without prejudice to the new suit O.S. No. 29 of 1984 already instituted by the plaintiff.

2. The first defendant denied the agreement as also the allegation that the plaintiff had been put in possession of the suit property thereunder. She also pointed out that she had as early as on 4-10-1979 withdrawn her expression of willingness to sell the property to the plaintiff vide Ext.B3 and therefore the suit was in any event barred by limitation, as it had not been filed within three years therefrom.

3. Based on these pleadings, the trial court framed issues as to whether the agreement for sale set up by the plaintiff was true, and as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial court did not render a finding on the first point as it held that the suit had to fall on the ground of limitation. The court held that Article 54 of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act provided for a period of three years for a suit for specific performance of a contrast, from the date on which the plaintiff had notice that performance was refused, if no date had been fixed in the agreement for performance. Parties were agreed that no date for performance had been fixed in this case. The plaintiff admittedly knew about the refusal of the first defendant to perform the contract when she received the letter Ext. B3 dated 4-10-1979 and therefore the suit filed beyond three years of that dat