1993 Supreme(Ker) 275
Judges : K.P.BALANARAYANA MARAR
Thankappan - Appellant
Versus
Raghavan - Respondent
Case No : S.A.No. 759 of 1986
Decided On : 07/28/1993
Advocates Appeared :
P. Sukumaran Nayar (Sr. advocate) A.K. Chiiman For Appellant George Varghese, Mathew Thomas & K.K. Babu For Respondents
The period between the dismissal and restoration of a copy application can be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act.
Headnote:
printing charges - restoration of copy application - S.12 of the Limitation Act - Rule 242 of Kerala Civil Rules of Practice - Sreevalsan Pillai v. ThankamoniAmma (1987 (I) KLT 108) - Iqbal Singh v. A.B. Subbarao (AIR 1973 A.P. 193) - Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Narayana Ayyangar (1895 ILR 18 Mad. 374) - Berumull Sowcar v. Vein Gramany (AIR 1942 Mad. 369) - Hari Prasad v. Chief Conserv of Forests (AIR 1959 Mad. 406)
Fact of the Case:
The appellant's suit to set aside attachment of movables and for injunction was dismissed by the trial court. The appeal was presented beyond the period of limitation due to the dismissal of the application for a certified copy of the judgment and decree. The appellant filed a petition to condone the delay, but it was dismissed, leading to the second appeal.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the period between the dismissal of the copy application and its restoration can be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was presented in time, and the lower appellate court's decision was set aside.
Issues: The main issue was whether the period between the dismissal of the copy application and its restoration could be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy for the purpose of appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on various decisions, including Sreevalsan Pillai v. ThankamoniAmma, Iqbal Singh v. A.B. Subbarao, Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Narayana Ayyangar, Berumull Sowcar v. Vein Gramany, and Hari Prasad v. Chief Conserv of Forests, to establish that the period between the dismissal and restoration of the copy application can be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the court below were set aside. The lower appellate court was directed to restore the appeal to its file and dispose of the same on merits.
The substantial question of law which arises for consideration, as formulated in the appeal memorandum, is "whether the period between the date fixed for the payment of printing charges and The date on which the printing charges are paid can be considered as time requisite for obtaining the certified copy in a case where the copy application was dismissed for default but later on restored to file".
2. Appellant is the plaintiff in a suit to set aside attachment of movables and for injunction. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The application for issue of a certified copy of the judgment and decree was dismissed for non-payment of printing charges and non-production of stamp papers. The copy application was subsequently restored to file. On the basis of the copies obtained an appeal was presented before Additional District Court, Mavelikara as A.S. No. 25/81. the lower appellate court felt that the appeal was presented beyond the period of limitation. A petition was therefore filed by the appellant as LA. 57/81 requesting an order that the appeal may be found and not barred by limitation. The court dismissed that petition finding that there is no valid reason to condone the delay in filing the appeal and in consequence the appeal was also dismissed as one filed out of time. Hence the second appeal.
3. Heard counsel on both sides.
4. The Kerala Civil rules of Practice do not provide for restoration of a copy application struck off the file. Rule 242 enables the Chief Ministerial Officer to strike off a copy application on the applicant failing to supply the stamp papers called for. Though there is no specific provision in the Rules of Practice enabling, the Court to restore to file an application for copies that was dismissed for default for non-compliance of the direction to produce stamp papers or to deposit printing charges. The court has inherent powers to restore such an application to file and to grant copies on that application. This position is not disputed. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the period between the date of dismissal of the copy application and the date of restoration can be taken as the time requisite for obtaining a copy for the purpose of appeal.
5. Relying on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Sreevalsan Pillai v. ThankamoniAmma (1987 (I) KLT 108) learned counsel for the appellant submits that the period between the date of dismissal and the date of restoration of the copy application can be considered as the time requisite for obtaining a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act. In that case a preliminary objection was raised that the appeal was barred by time. The contention was that the application for certified if copy of the order appealed against was dismissed for non-payment of printing charges but subsequently restored alter 11 months. The question arose whether the period between the dismissal of copy application and its restoration can be considered as time requisite for getting a copy. After quoting a passage from State of U. P. v Maharaja Narain (AIR 1968 SC 960) the Division Bench observed that the contention that the appeal is barred by time is without merit and the preliminary objection was overruled. The question involved in this case is whether the period between the date of dismissal and the date of restoration of the application en be considered as time requisite forgetting a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act is not seen to have been considered by the Supreme Court in the passage quoted in the judgment of the Division Bench. After referring to the provision contained in S.12(2) of the Limitation Act the Supreme Court in the passage quoted observed that there is no justification for restricting the scope of that provision. It was
further held by the Supreme Court that the court not only will have to see whether the appeal is in time on the basis of the information available from the copy of the orde