Varghese Kalliath, J.

These appeals are against the judgment in letters of administration proceedings, converted as a suit O.S. No.4 of 1990. The second plaintiff is the appellant in M.F.A. No. 631 of 1992 and plaintiffs 1, 3 and 4 are the appellants in M.F.A. No. 561 of 1992. In M.F.A. No. 631 of 1992, the appellant has arrayed plaintiffs Nos. 1, 3 and 4 as respondents. Similarly, in M.F.A. No. 561 of 1992, the second plaintiff is also a respondent. Both these appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are these: - Plaintiffs and defendants are the children of Mathai and Rahelamma. They executed their last will and testament on 14-5-1979 and got the will registered on 15-5-1979 at Aranmula Sub Registry Office. The father died on 30-8-1984 and the mother on 19-1-1980. The testator, the father and the testatrix, the mother, had seven children - six sons and one daughter. The third defendant is the only daughter. Defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs are the sons of the testator and the testatrix.

3. The plaintiffs submitted that the will produced is the duly executed last will of their father and mother and that the will has been executed after complying with all the statutory formalities required for the execution of a will and that the will has been duly registered by their parents. No executors/ executor are/is appointed in the will and so an application filed for probate was converted into letters of administration proceedings and finally since a caveat had been lodged by the first counter petitioner, the petition was converted into a suit.

4. The first defendant contested the suit. The contentions in brief are these: Technical and substantial contentions were raised. It was contended that the probate proceedings is not the proper proceedings since no executor was appointed in the will. This contention has no significance now, since the proceedings have been converted into letters of administration proceedings and finally converted as stated earlier, into a suit.

5. The first defendant raised the contention that since the entire properties included in the will are not scheduled in the petition, the petition is defective. Further, it is contended that at the time of execution of the alleged will, the testator the father and the testatrix, the mother had disposed of their entire properties included in the will and that the first defendant had become the absolute owner and in possession of schedule items 1,2 and 4 and the western 32 cents north to south, of schedule item No. 3 and the building in that property. Further, he contended that he is residing in that building. He also submitted that the plaintiffs are in possession of the respective properties allotted to them under an Udampady of 1972 as absolute owners. The third plaintiff is entitled to eastern 25 cents of item No.3 scheduled in the petition. The case of the first defendant is that the Udampady dated 18-3-1972 was accepted by the donees and the Udampady has taken effect, cannot be revoked. The life interest reserved in the Udampady has come to an end on the death of the executants of the Udampady.

6. It was then contended that at the time of the alleged will, the testator and testatrix had no sound disposing mind and that the alleged will is a spurious document and that the mother and father were defrauded and unduly influenced by the plaintiffs in executing the will. The first defendant also contended that the cancellation deed by which the Udampady was cancelled is a void document. The first defendant also contended that the valuation of the properties made in the proceedings is not correct.

7. The court below tried the matter as a suit treating the petition as the plaint and the caveat as the written statement. After considering the evidence and the circumstances unfolded in the case, the court ultimately came to the conclusion that Ext. Al will cannot be considered as a genuine will as defin