The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority.

BALANARAYANA MARAR, J

Revision arises from an order in a Rent Control Petition. Revision petitioners are respondents-tenants of the building sought to be evicted by respondent-landlord. Petitioners failed to appear on the date of hearing and after setting them ex parte the Rent Control Court allowed the application. Petitioners moved the Rent Control Court by I. A.2056/ 1989 to get the ex parte order set aside. Another petition was also filed as I.A.2035/ 1989 to excuse the delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte order. The reason for the absence is alleged to be the illness of petitioners. Respondent resisted the petition. The Rent Control Court after hearing both sides dismissed both the petitions by a common order dated 1-1-1990. The reason for the absence was not satisfactorily explained according to the Rent Control Court and the reason for the delay was also not established. On appeal Addl. District Court, Palakked concurred with that order and dismissed the appeal. The appellate Court further stated that the petition to set aside the ex parte order is barred by limitation and S. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the Rent Control Court so as to enable petitioner to get the delay in filing the petition excused. Hence the revision.

2. Heard counsel on both sides.

3. It is argued in the main that S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. Section 5 reads as follows:-

"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of O.XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."

4. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 shall apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by any special or local law where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is therefore contended that in the absence of an exclusion provided in the Rent Control Act, S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies and petitioners have got a right to get the petition admitted on satisfaction that they had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. On the other hand, it is argued by learned counsel for the respondent that S. 5 applies only to Courts and Rent Control and the Appellate Authority are persona designata and not Courts so as to attract the provision contained in S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The position as far as this Court is concerned has been concluded by the Division Bench decision in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, 1974 AIR(Ker) 162. Since counsel has argued the matter at length and has referred to various decisions, it is only appropriate to refer to those decision before expressing our views in the matter.

5. Counsel for revision petitioners has drawn attention to the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Rethinasamy v. Nomalavalli, 1983 AIR(Mad) 45. The Division Bench was considering the applicability of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding under S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It was held that for the purpose of Ss. 3, 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Appellate Authority constituted under the Rent Control Act is a Court and S. 5 was found to be applicable to an appeal preferred before the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 23(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act. This decision cannot be relied on since a Full Bench of this Court in Jokkim Fernandez's case (supra) has held otherwise. The Full Bench by a majority speaking through Gopalan Nambiar J. (as be then was) held that Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to Courts and prescribes periods of limitation in res