The main legal point established is the need for a speedy disposal of industrial disputes and the discouragement of stalling proceedings or raising frivolous preliminary objections to delay adjudication.

Even though the pleadings are elaborate the facts to be considered fall in a narrow compass. The dispute, stated to be arising between the petitioners and second respondent, was referred for adjudication by Ext.P2. It says that Government is of opinion that the industrial dispute exists between the second respondent and the petitioners, as well as the workmen of the second respondent including Sri. K. Rajamoni, the first respondent, in respect of the matters mentioned in the Annexure and the same is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Kozhikode. The Industrial Tribunal was directed to pass award within a period of three months. The dispute referred is: "Eligibility of the workmen, employed for the construction of Padinjarathara Dam for Kuttiadi Augmentation Scheme, for the wage rates and other benefits fixed in the minimum wage notifications issued by the State Government for the workers doing similar works in the employments coming under Item No.3.7 and B part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, and (2) Conversion of the advance paid to the above workers as payable wages."

2. Notice relating to reference was received by the petitioners on 18-2-1992. The Industrial Tribunal viz. the third respondent registered the dispute as I.D.No.2 of 1992and posted the same on 9-3-1992 at kozhikode. On that day the petitioners, through their counsel, prayed for one month's time for filing written statement. But the petitioners were given only a week's time by the third respondent. The case was thereafter posted to 16-3-1992 with the endorsement that no further time would be granted for tiling the written statement. On 16-3-1992a senior counsel was engaged by the Board and the case stood adjourned to 30-3-1992. On 30 -3-1992 the Board as well as the contractor filed written statements. The case was adjourned for evidence on 20-4-1992. on 20-4-1992 the claimant filed a rejoinder raising fresh contentions and allegations against the Board. The petitioner) Board wanted to file a replication. The case was posted to 11-5-1992, even though the Board wanted one month's time for filing the replication. On 11-5-1992 the Board also filed a supplementary statement clarifying certain points and also filed an application viz. C.M.P.N6.26 of 1992 in I.D.No.2 of 1992. Petitioners wanted to produce certain documents and also for permission to adduce oral evidence But, by order dated 18-5-1992, the third respondent Tribunal dismissed the prayer of the Kerala State Electricity Board and posted the case on 27-5-1992 for final hearing. Ext.P8 is the said order. The order says that:

"On examination of the petition to summon the documents and also the objection raised by the authorised representative of the workman and the contractor, I find that the documents now required to be summoned are not at all necessary for the adjudication of this diffuse, in the light of the circumstances of the case. Hence the petition summoning the documents is dismissed."

This original petition is filed for quashing Ext.P8 order.

3. The Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd: v. P.P.Mundhe (1975) IILLJ. 379 noticed the delay and consequential disadvantage and hardship that may be caused by the writ courts interfering with the speedy disposal of industrial dispute. With a view to obviate undue delay in adjudication of the real dispute caused by moving writ courts, the Supreme Court advised against stalling of industrial adjudication by questioning decision relating to preliminary issues. In the aforesaid decision their Lordships observed as follows:

"We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the

final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene, at this stage. We are making these observations in our