The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Government's power to cancel its own order must be exercised fairly and reasonably to avoid arbitrariness and discrimination, and the appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor should only occur in special circumstances, not merely based on the engagement of a leading criminal lawyer by the accused.

Government of Kerala appointed fourth respondent as Special Public Prosecutor and fifth respondent as additional Special Public Prosecutor for conducting prosecution in the trial of particular murder case. Subsequently, Government cancelled the said appointment as per Ex. P2 proceedings. Petitioner, father of the deceased in the said murder case, has filed this original petition challenging Ex. P2.

2. According to the petitioner. The Muslim community in Malappuram District is faction ridden, one group known as "A.P. group" owing allegiance to Congress party and the other known as "E.K. group" owing allegiance to Muslim League Party and that all the accused in the murder case belong to "E.K. group" while deceased was loyal to the rival group. Petitioner challenges Ext. P2 other mainly on the ground that it was passed at the behest of Muslim League which is a dominent constituent of the ruling front in Kerala State, solely for the purpose of helping the accused in the murder case.

3. Government of Kerala tried to defend Ext. P2 order on different grounds in the affidavit sworn by the Joint Secretary to its Home Department. It is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the order appointing respondents 4 and 5 as Special Public Prosecutor and additional Special Public Prosecutor respectively, was passed without any deliberation much less any enquiry and that when Government received a petition alleging that the appointment order was politically motivated, it was enquired into through the Superintendent of Police, District collector and Director General of Prosecutor and all of them recommended for cancellation of the appointment order on the premise that there was no special situation for appointing a Special Public Prosecutor in the case. Another reason advanced in defence of the cancellation order is that "Government is in utmost financial constraints". A third ground is that the regularly appointed Public Prosecutors are competent to conduct prosecution fairly and honestly and if a Special Public Prosecutor is appointed, except in extra-ordinary circumstances, the morale of the existing public Prosecutors would be impaired.

4. It is not disputed that the Government has the power to cancel or revoke its own order. This power has been recognised in S. 16 and as well as in S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (vide S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 and Union of India v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1975 SC 641) However, in exercising such power, Government must act fairly and reasonably. Otherwise, the exercise is arbitrary and consequently discriminatory and would offend Art, 14 of the Constitution. Recently the Supreme Court has considered the question in the wake of termination of a batch of Government counsel appointed in Uttar Pradesh (vide Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537). J. S. Verma, J., who wrote the judgment, pointed out thus:

"The Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. Exclusion of Art. 14 in contractual matters is not permissible in constitutional scheme. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Art. 14 and permit judicial review, it can be said that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. Therefore it would be difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Art. 14".

Their Lordships followed the d