The main legal point established is that a Regional Transport Authority can only impose conditions on a permit as enumerated under the Motor Vehicles Act and lacks the power to impose conditions outside the purview of the Act.

Petitioner challenges the conditions in Ext.P-1 order issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram. The offensive conditions, according to him, are that he should not curtail any portion of the route or apply for another route curtailing/ varying any portion of the route already granted and that the permit would stand automatically cancelled as and when the vehicle causes an accident. Contention of the petitioner is that the Regional Transport Authority (first respondent) has no jurisdiction to impose such conditions.

2. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the first respondent is vested with jurisdiction to impose the aforesaid conditions.

3. Section 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act enumerates the general conditions attaching to all permits. S.84 empowers the transport authority, which granted a permit to cancel or suspend it for particular periods as it thinks fit on conditions enumerated thereunder. S.71 provides for the procedure of the Regional Transport Authority in considering the applications for stage carriage permit. S.72 provides that subject to the provisions of S.71 a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under S.70, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Sub-section (2) provides that the Regional Transport Authority if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a stage carriage of a specified description and may, subject to any rules that may be made under the Act, attach to the permit the conditions enumerated thereunder. The conditions enumerated under S.72(2) do not empower the Regional Transport Authority to impose the aforementioned conditions while granting the permit. Of course,/itis open to the Regional Transport Authority to vary the conditions of the permit or attach to the permit further conditions. The authority is given that power under S.72(2)(xxii). This can be done after giving notice of not less than one month to the party concerned. This does not mean that the Regional Transport Authority can impose conditions other than those mentioned under S.72(2). If the Regional Transport Authority is of opinion that the conditions imposed in the permit are not sufficient and if it wants to include further conditions enumerated under sub-section (2) of S.72, it can do so after giving notice to the party. In other words, further conditions that can be attached to the permit can only be those enumerated under sub-section (2) and not any condition of its choice and outside the purview of sub-section (2). The conditions imposed by the first respondent do fall outside those enumerated under sub-section (2). It goes without saying that the first respondent lacked jurisdiction to impose the aforementioned conditions in the permit.

4. Learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order is appealable one and so the writ petition is not maintainable. Government Pleader further submitted that the order is appealable as provided under S.89(1)(a) and as the petitioner has an alternative effective remedy available he cannot get any relief from this Court by invoking Art.226 of the Constitution of India. As the conditions imposed in the permit are challenged on the fundamental proposition that the Regional Transport Authority lacked jurisdiction to do so, the above contention of the Government Pleader is not tenable. As the challenge against the conditions imposed in Ext.P1 goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, existence of alternative remedy is no bar to the remedy under Art. 226-of the Constitution. In a case where an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, existence of alternative remedy is not a bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. In Calcutta Discount Company v. Income-tax Officer (1961 (2) SCR 241) the Supreme Court held:

"The High Courts have ample powers under