The main legal point established in the judgment is that strangers seeking to set aside a court sale pursuant to decrees to which they were not parties should seek declaratory relief, not a suit to set aside the court sale. Additionally, the court affirmed the power of the court to restore possession under S.151 CPC when a party violates an order of injunction.

This Appeal by sixth defendant in the suit is directed against the concurrent findings of the courts below. The courts below declared that a court sale, pursuant to Ext. A7 decree in O.S.147/68, was not binding on the respondent/ plaintiffs.

2. The chronology of events, leading to the Suit from which the Second Appeal arises, is as follows: The original owner of the Suit property, 4th defendant, sold it to 5th defendant by Ext. A2 dated 18-2-1958 and he, in turn sold it to 'Nair Sahodhara Sangham' by Ext. A1 dated 6-7-1960. Plaintiff N.S.S. Karayogam stepped into the shoes of the 'Nair Sahodhara Sangham' by reason of Exts. A3 and All. While so, one Sankaran Narayanan filed a Suit, OS 359/63 against the aforesaid Sangham, and that ended in a compromise (Ext. A5). Earlier, 4th defendant had executed Ext. B4 chitty bond in favour of first defendant. Based on that, first defendant filed OS 147/68 against the 4thdefendant. Ext. A6 the judgment in that Suit and Ext.A7 the decree: Plaintiffs were not parties to the Suit.

3. In execution of Ext. A7 decree, the suit property was sold in court auction. Defendants 2 & 3 purchased the same. Ext. A8 is the Delivery Kychit. Later, 3rd defendant executed Ext. A9 release deed in favour of second defendant. Second defendant conveyed her rights to 6th defendant under Ext. B1 dated 24-9-1975.

4. Coming to know of the Court sale, plaintiffs filed the present Suit for setting aside the same and for a declaration that the sale was not binding on them. Appellant/ 6th defendant resisted the Suit on the ground that plaintiff N.S.S. Karayogam, had not obtained any rights in the property. The courts below concurrently found that the court sale was not binding on the plaintiffs.

5. In addition to the contentions raised in the suit, counsel for appellant contended that the Suit was barred by limitation, and that the Courts below should not have invoked S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to restore possession to plaintiffs. Elaborating his contention, counsel submitted that a Suit for setting aside the sale has to be filed within one year of the confirmation of sale by reason of Art, 99 of the Limitation Act, and that the Suit filed beyond one year of that period is barred by limitation. Answering this contention, counsel for respondents submitted that the Suit was due for a declaration, that the sale will not bind respondents, and that the question of limitation, relating to a Suit falling under Art.99, was alien to the context.

6. The imprecise language in which the prayers are couched, gives rise to an argument that the prayer is to set aside the court sale. The time for filing a suit for that purpose, is one year under Art.99. Indisputably, the suit was filed beyond that period. But, a prayer for a declaration that the sale is not binding on the plaintiffs, is incorporated in prayer (b). True, there is also a specific prayer for setting aside

the sale. Clarity of thinking and precision in drafting, are not virtues of the plaint in question. But, on a reasonable understanding of prayer (b), a prayer for the declaration aforesaid, can be gleaned.

7. More importantly, the relief that can be claimed in a case like this, where the plaintiff is not a party to the suit leading to the sale, can only be one for a declaration that the decree and sale will not bind him, a stranger. It will not be proper for him to seek the remedy of setting aside the sale. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held consistently that the remedy for a stranger to a suit, in which a sale is ordered, is a declaratory relief and not a suit to set aside the court sale. In Manohar Lal v. Jadunath Singh (33 Indian Appeals 128), the Judicial Committee observed that the appropriate relief in such circumstances would be a declaration that the decree does not bind one who was not a party to the suit. The principle, upon which this view rests, is that decision cannot bind a stranger to the proceedings. It is not proper to s