The involvement in criminal cases, even if resulting in acquittal, is a relevant factor in considering the revocation of an arms license. The statutory authorities have a duty to carefully consider and circumspectly grant arms licenses, taking into account changing societal and environmental conditions.

The legal profession has more than casual connection with the arms and the governing laws. A great Judge, Lord Atkin, spoke about law speaking in the same voice even amidst the clash of arms. (See Liversedge v. Anderson, (1942) AC 206.) That wan on the academic aspect. Even on its physical features, the legal profession had much to contribute. It was Lord Armstrong, shortly after his sojourn as a solicitor, that gave much of concentration in the perfection of the shooting rifle. The British army used it in more wars than one. The recognition of his contribution is reflected in the patenting of the rifle after his name - Armstrong's rifles. (See A History of Our Own Times, from the Diamond Jubilee 1897 to the Association of Edward VII by Justin Mc Carthy, pages 216 to 220.) Little did Lord Armstrong realise that in years to come, that the little weapon would be wielded by anti social elements as well for subverting the Rule of Law, - the illicit distillers, the poppy barons, the plotting poachers, the sneaky smugglers and the dreadful terrorists. The abuses of arms licence, appear to be on the increase. The present is an illustrative case.

2. The petitioner, who describes himself as an agriculturist, and a resident in Kizhakkencherry village in Alathur Taluk of Palghat District was armed with an arms licence, granted in the year 1980. The area of its operation was Palghat District; and the duration, up to the end of the year 1982. There were complaints that he had abused the licence and the weapon - an S.B.B.L. Gun with facility for purchase of 100 catridges at a time and 300 catridges in an year.

3. The petitioner was involved in a murder case, convicted by the Sessions Court, but ultimately acquitted by the High Court. He was also involved in a rioting case. The Superintendent of Police, Palghat, moved the statutory authority, the District Magistrate, for the cancellation of the licence. By order dt. 15-10-1982, the licence was cancelled. The order was appealed against before the Board of Revenue. The matter was argued before that authority by counsel. The Board by its order dt. 16-10-1986 declined to interfere with the order of the Magistrate. The validity of these orders is challenged.

4. According to the petitioner, there is illegality and impropriety in the authorities accepting and acting on the representation of the Superintendent of Police; there has not been any proper application of mind to the relevant circumstances. The acquittal in the criminal cases is emphasised as a factor entitling him to the continued grant of licence.

5. The arguments advanced before this Court also centered round the inadequacy of materials justifying cancellation of the licence.

6. It is desirable to preface the discussion of the contentions by a general reference to the background and salutary provisions of the legislation.

7. The law relating to fire arms had been under diligent vigil of the Legislature in enlightened countries. Even a casual reference to the legislative exercises in England after the Fire Arms Act of 1920 would indicate how Parliament had been alive to plug the loopholes in the working of that Act. The Act had been amended in 1937. A comprehensive enactment was brought into force under the Fire Arms Act, 1968. Even in relation to other offensive weapons, the Parliament there, had been highly agile. The Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, prohibited possession of offensive weapons in a public place without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. The restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1969 sought to rope in many kinds of weapons such as flick knife or flick gun. It was noted in England that there had been a whole bevy of cases, in which flick knives had been used often with lethal effect in affrays and brawls, and the public was not unnaturally, alarmed. Parliament acted in order to allay such alarm. A gap in that Act was noticed and commented upon in Fisher v. Bell, (1960) 3 All ER 731. The Parliament acted in o