The main legal point established in the judgment is that the principle of res judicata applies when a matter has been heard and finally decided, and a party's failure to raise a plea in earlier proceedings may bar them from raising it later.

1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) Alleppey in AA No. 57 of 1978.

2. The petitioner filed OA 771 of 1977 before the Land Tribunal, Trivandrum under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for purchase of kudikidappu rights in respect of 61/2 cents of land alleging that the building occupied by the petitioner was a'hut' within the meaning of Explanation.2(25)(a) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The application was dismissed by the Land Tribunal. The appeal filed therefrom also ended in dismissal. The main reason for the dismissal of the application was that the respondent had filed OP (BRC) No. 248 of 1974 and had obtained an order of eviction against the petitioner herein and that the petitioner had not raised any plea of kudikidappu in that proceedings.

3. The contention now urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the Rent Control Court which was later confirmed by the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court does not operate as res judicata as the petitioner herein did not contest the matter and that the earlier order of eviction passed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is not an order passed on merits.

4. In order to substantiate this contention a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Subramonian v. Anandanarayanan (1985 KLT 227) was cited. That was a case where the respondent therein filed a suit for injunction and damages. The defendants-appellants claimed tenancy right over the property. They had filed an earlier application before the Land Tribunal for purchase of tenancy rights. After the filing of the application they did not pursue the matter and therefore the same was dismissed. This Court held that the earlier order passed by the Land Tribunal in dismissing the application for purchase did not finally hear and decide the controversy between the parties and therefore it would not operate as res judicata.

5. The relevant provision of the CPC is S.11. S.11 with Explanation IV reads as follows:

11. Res judicata No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such Court".

"Explanation.4 Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit."

In the earlier rent control proceedings filed by the respondent the revision-petitioner entered appearance; but later remained ex parte and did not contest the proceedings. This ex parte order was challenged by the revision petitioner unsuccessfully before the Appellate Court and revisional court. The revision petitioner did not contend before the rent control court that the building occupied by him was a but and that he was a kudikidappukaran in that property. This is a matter which might and ought to have been raised as a ground of defence in the earlier proceedings.

6. This Court in Ranga Pai v. Special Tahsildar, Vypeen (1983 KLT 77) held that if a person resisting any earlier proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, did not raise a contention before the Rent Control Court that he was a kudikidappukaran and that he contested the petition for eviction as a tenant, he cannot later contend that he was a kudikidappukaran. His plea of kudikidappu was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. So also in Lakshmi Ammal v. Madhavan Pillai (1978 KLT 484) this Court held that a person who had full opportunity of recourse at the trial stage to the protection of the statute and failed to raise that plea ca