The main legal point established in the judgment is the recognition of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and the discretion of the courts in granting dissolution of marriage under S.2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939.

1. This is a matrimonial cause. The wife complained of cruelty and not providing maintenance to her husband. She also contended that the marriage has broken irretrievably. On these grounds, she prayed for a dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The husband resisted the suit. The trial court dismissed the suit. Plain tiff-wife filed an appeal. The appellate court found that the plaintiff has made out a valid ground under S.2(ix) of the Act. Now, the defendant-husband appeals.

2. The sequence of the relevant facts is this: The marriage of the parties took place on 10-10-1971. The "Nikkah" ceremonies were in the home of the husband. The husband and wife began to live together in the husband's home from November, 1972. After some months husband took it as a habit to come home after consuming liquor. He began to indulge in horse-play in the home. When the wife questioned, the usual answer was an assault on her. Later, the husband made his home itself the venue for his drinking spree. He used to become boisterous and violent on such occasions. A drunken carousal followed every day in the company of his friends. Any resentment by the wife resulted in severe assault on her. In 1978, she left her home for her parents' house. Mediation followed. She returned to her husband's home, but the husband continued his habits with added vigour. In January. 1981, wife sought permission to go to her parents' house, since her life with her husband became a perpetual torture and mental agony for her. She was taken to her home in January. 1981. The husband never cared to maintain her and showed any concern for her. The wife says that there is a complete break down of marriage which is irretrievable. The husband stoutly denied the allegations. The legal proceedings commenced in 1983. The facts of the case reveal that from 1981 onwards, the parties are not living together as husband and wife.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant-husband submits that the finding of the appellate court that there is irretrievable break down of marriage is incorrect and requires a re-consideration by this court.

4. S.2(ix) of the Act is really in the form of a residuary ground where the courts have an area of discretion and freedom. The reality in this case is that the husband and wife are living separately from 1981 onwards and the wife has expressed in clear and plain terms her great hatred and aversion towards the defendant-husband. Though the case of cruelty has not been sustained on proof the wife has said in unequivocal terms that she is unwilling to continue as the wife of the appellant. She has even laid that she is not prepared to receive any amount as maintenance from her husband. She says that to compel her to live as the wife of the defendant is an infliction of a penal servitude on her.

5. The question is, in such a situation, whether this court can interfere with a finding recorded by the appellate court that the marriage has broken irretrievably and that the marriage has to be dissolved under subsection (ix) of S.2 of the Act. Certainly, in matrimonial causes, the court should strive as far as possible, to have a rapprochement between the parties so as to restore the conjugal harmony. We believe that family is the grass-root unit of the nation and that the strength of the nation largely depends on the unity and strength of this primary integer of the nation the family. A benign and kind rapprochement process is absolutely necessary on the part of matrimonial courts when approaching a matrimonial cause. This is done in fact not in the interests of the parties alone, but in the interests of the general public and also in the interests of the off-springs if any, of the fighting husband and wife. But, the other facet of the problem is that it is not always in the interests of the parties or in the interests of the public that a man and a woman should be by compulsion, bound