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1987 Supreme(Ker) 316

Judges : PAREED PILLAY
BHASKAR TRADERS - Appellant
Versus
KUNJIRAMAN - Respondent
Case No : C.R.P. No. 1781 of 1984
Decided On : 07/22/1987
Advocates Appeared :
M. Vijayakumar; For Petitioner P.M. Mohammed; For Respondent

The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the principle of res judicata, including constructive res judicata, to execution proceedings, and the preclusion of raising objections at a later stage if not raised at the appropriate time.

Headnote:

EXEMPTION - Execution Proceedings - S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure - S.11 CPC, Explanation.7 - First proviso to S.60(1) - Principle of res judicata - Constructive res judicata - Supreme Court precedents - [S.60(1)(c) - S.11 CPC, Explanation.7 - First proviso to S.60(1)] - The court discussed the applicability of S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principle of res judicata in execution proceedings. It highlighted the importance of raising objections at the appropriate stage and the preclusion of raising the same objection at a later stage. The court also referred to Supreme Court precedents to support its decision.

Fact of the Case:

The revision petitioner, a judgment debtor, filed an application alleging exemption under S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure in execution proceedings. The executing Court rejected the contention, stating that it was raised at a later stage to procrastinate the proceedings.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the judgment debtor cannot advance contentions at different stages of the execution proceedings and referred to relevant provisions and precedents to support its decision. It concluded that the petitioner's contention was barred by constructive res judicata and upheld the rejection of the execution application.

Issues: The key issue was whether the judgment debtor could raise exemption under S.60(1)(c) at a later stage of the execution proceedings, despite not raising it when the property was attached.

Ratio Decidendi: The court established that the principle of res judicata, including constructive res judicata, applies to execution proceedings. It emphasized the importance of raising objections at the appropriate stage and precluded the petitioner from raising the same objection at a later stage.

Final Decision: The CRP was dismissed, and the executing Court's rejection of the execution application was upheld.

Judgment :-

1. Revision petitioner is the judgment debtor in EP 100 of 1983 in OS 390 of 1982 of the Munsiff Court, Cannanore. Revision petitioner filed EA 174 of 1984 in EP 100 of 1983 alleging that he is an agriculturist entitled to exemption under S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. That contention was rejected by the executing Court mainly on the ground that such an objection was raised only when the property was proclaimed for sale and after it was adjourned on several occasions on his applications. The Court also held that the attempt is to procrastinate the execution proceedings.

2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that even though the petitioner did at not contend that he is entitled to exemption under S 60(1)(c) of the CPC when he received the notice of attachment he still can very well urge it when the property is brought for sale.

3. The point that arises for consideration is whether the judgment-debtor can advance his contentions piece-meal and at different stages of the execution proceedings. Counsel for the petitioner relied on Kannan v. Govindan (1962 KLT 675) for the proposition that a judgment-debtor can very well contend that he is entitled to exemption under S 60(1)(c) at the time when property is brought to sale even though he failed to raise it when he received the notice of attachment. Facts of the case in 1963 KLT 675 have no application to the case in hand. In Kannan's case (1962 KLT 675) this Court was not satisfied that by serving a notice for recognising the assignment and for execution of the decree, the judgment debtor was given notice of attachment of a particular property. In the above decision it was held in Para.4 as follows:

"Unless there is more evidence to prove that the copy or copies served on him were the attachment schedule and other papers which give him sufficient notice of the intended attachment of a particular property, he should not be held to be debarred from raising his objection to the attachment even in a subsequent execution petition."

In the case in hand the position is entirely different. The petitioner has no case that he did not receive any notice of attachment or that he was prevented by sufficient circumstances to raise his contention that the property was not attachable in view of S.60(1)(c) of the Code.

4. Explanation.7 to S.11 was inserted by the CPC Amendment Act of 1976. Explanation.7 reads:

"The provisions of this Section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this Section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. "Explanation7 specifically enacts that rule of res judicata applies to execution proceedings. That being the position it is futile to contend that the petitioner could claim exemption under S.60(1)(c) even though he did not urge it when he received notice of attachment.

5. First proviso to S.60(1) enumerates various categories of properties that are rot liable to attachment or sale. When a property is attached and notice is issued to the party concerned it is for him to claim exemption under any of the categories detailed in the first proviso then and there. As the petitioner did not raise his objection at the time when he received the notice of attachment he is precluded from raising such an objection subsequently. Explanation.4 to S.11 postulates that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. As the petitioner did not raise his objection at the time when he received the notice of attachment as he "might end ought" to have done, be is precluded by Explanation.4 to S.11 CPC from raising such an objection subsequently by the rule of constructive res judicata. Even before Expla



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