An acknowledgement under S.18 of the Limitation Act need not necessarily be in the handwriting of the maker to be effective, and various modes of signing, including thumb impression or mark, were recognized as valid signatures under the General Clauses Act.

1. An acknowledgement under S.18 of the Limitation Act must be of a liability. It must relate to some existing debt or other obligation to some property or right. The liability must be existing on the date of acknowledgement. It must be in writing end signed by the person against whom such property or right is claimed or by some person through whom he derives his title or liability. The acknowledgement must be before the expiry of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of such property or right. These are essential conditions for a valid acknowledgement in order to be effective for the purpose of enabling computation of a fresh period of limitation from the time the acknowledgement was so signed. When the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated oral evidence can be given to prove when it was signed. But the additional question for consideration in this civil revision petition filed by the plaintiff in a money suit is whether the writing containing the acknowledgement must also be in the handwriting of the maker in order to make it effective.

2. Plaintiff Bank sued two defendants on the basis of a liability incurred on 28-5-1973. There are two acknowledgements dated 5-5-1976 and 16-4-1979 (Exts. A12 and All). These acknowledgements were pleaded in the plaint and the suit was within time from the date of the second acknowledgement. Second defendant remained exparte. First defendant denied the acknowledgements and raised other contentions also denying liability. Trial court on the evidence found that the acknowledgements to be signed by the defendants. Solely on the ground that the second acknowledgement is not written in the handwriting of the first defendant, though signed by him, the trial court refused to accept it as a valid acknowledgement capable of extending the period of limitation. The suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation alone without considering the other issues.

3. I do not think that such an interpretation is possible from the wording of S.18. The wording is has been made in writing signed'. It need not necessarily be by the party against whom the property or right is claimed. It is enough if the acknowledgement is by any person through whom the defendant derives his title or liability. An omission to specify the exact nature of the property or right will not make an acknowledgement ineffective. Even the signature need not necessarily be by the party himself. It is enough if it is signed by an agent duly authorised in that behalf. An acknowledgement merely renews the liability and gives the creditor a fresh period of limitation according to the nature of the liability that exists on the date of acknowledgement. It cannot create a new title or a fresh cause of action as one sees in a promise to pay a barred debt. I is not a new contract. Acknowledgement need not necessarily be addressed to the creditor or the person entitled to sue or make the application. What is intended is mainly only an admission of the jural relationship with the intention of admitting the same. But nowhere in the section it is stated that the writing must be in the hand of the person against whom the property or right is claimed or by any person through whom he derives title or liability. In order to give such as interpretation we will have to read into the section something which is not there. There is nothing in the section to indicate a legislative intent that the acknowledgement must be written in the hand of the maker. Written and signed acknowledgements are insisted only because otherwise it will be a fruitful source of false pleas.

4. If such an interpretation as given by the trial court is accepted an illiterate or invalid person must be held to be incapable of making an acknowledgement because he cannot write in his own hand. That could never be the legislative intent. When the section is so clear that acknowledgement need only be in writing and signed, courts are not justified in readin