The main legal point established in the judgment is that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case, and the evidence of a victim of sexual assault is entitled to great weight. The court also clarified the legal principles regarding penetration, hymen rupture, and the sufficiency of medical evidence in establishing rape.

1. Revision petitioner was convicted for offences punishable under Ss 376 450 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 years and a fine of Rs.500/- under S.376 rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs. 500/- under S.450 and rigorous imprisonment for two years under S.506(ii) with permission to suffer the substantive sentences concurrently. The appeal filed before the Sessions Judge was unsuccessful.

2. The prosecution case has been fully narrated in the judgments of the Courts below. It appeals that on 30-3-1982 at about 6.45 P.M., when PW 1 Jyothi Lakshmi, aged 11 alone was inside the kitchen of her house the accused pushed open the door, entered ins Kitchen, caught hold on her threatened her with death when she cried and committed rape on her When the sexual assault was going on. PW. 2, Aunt of PW. 1, came and saw it and she cried aloud attracting PW. 3 a neighbour. The accused then ran away.

3. PW.1 was taken to the Government Hospital where she was examined by PW. 6 Doctor who issued Ext. P4 wound certificate. The vaginal smear of PW.1 was sent for chemical examination, and Ext. P5 is the report which shows that semen and spermatozoa were not detected. Ext. P4 and the evidence of PW.6 showed that PW.1 had an abrasion on the back of right elbow, another abrasion on the front of lower third of right forearm, and contusion over the labia majora on both sides Hymen was in tact. It is also stated that there is no evidence of recent sexual intercourse.

4. The evidence of the Doctor (PW. 6) is that the first injury could be had by a fall on the back and the second one if some attempt to rape is made. This is quite in accordance with the evidence of PW.1 and the first information statement given by her shortly after the incident. PW-6 examined PW.1 within three hours of the incident and the same version was given to PW.6 also. PW. 6 further said that the third injury in the labia majora on both sides can be caused by forcible attempted penetration of penis into the vagina. This is also in accordance with the Evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Ext. PI. PW. 6 okayed the suggestion based on the opinion of Dr. Modi that partial penetration of penis within the labia majora of the vulva or pudendum with or without emission of semen or even attempt at penetration is sufficient for constituting rape, and that hymen need not be ruptured. he further said that his opinion that there was no evidence of recent sexual intercourse was only in the sense that there was no penetration of the penis into the vaginal canal and emission of semen. PW. 6 admitted that there was forcible attempt to introduce penis into the vaginal canal of the child and the opinion was given only because hymen was not ruptured. He also said that penis must have rubbed against the labia majora producing the contusion and therefore forcible attempt of rape was made.

5. I shall consider the opinion of the Doctor again. The happening of the incident cannot be now disputed and it was not actually disputed also. The only argument was that rape has not been proved and what is proved is only an attempt. The former view was that though the prosecutrix cannot be considered to be an accomplice, on the basis of rule of caution and prudence and not on the basis of any rule of law, courts should normally look for some corroboration of her testimony in order to satisfy itself that the prosecutrix is telling the truth and that a person, accused of rape, has not been falsely implicated, even though not in all cases. The nature of the extent of corroboration where it was not considered safe to dispense with it, was held to vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged, (See Rameshwar Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, A. W. Khan v. State (AIR 1962 Calcutta 641 and Madho Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 469). But the judicial conception in