The main legal point established in the judgment is that a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

1. The question whether a Trade Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court falls for decision in this writ petition. The first petitioner is a Private Limited Company carrying on business of manufacturing and marketing pharmaceutical. The second petitioner is a citizen of India having substantive interest in the first petitioner. The third petitioner is the Manager of field operations of the regional office of the Company.

2. The first respondent, Kerala Medical and Sales Representatives' Association is a Trade Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. Respondents 4 and 5, the medical representatives employed by the first petitioner, are members of the Union. Respondents 4 and 5 who had been deputed for training have in defiance of the instructions entered on leave. Their case has been taken up by the first respondent and thus respondents 1, 4 and 5 had been indulging in acts preventing the third petitioner as well as the Area Field Manager from discharging their function and threatening them with dire consequences if they work. It is, therefore, necessary to direct first respondent to desist from undulging in illegal activities and further direct respondents 2 and 3 to reach police protection to the petitioners' representatives.

3. Petitioners, on the above allegations, have prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus directing (i) the first respondent to forbear from preventing the petitioners and their men from carrying out their field operations (2) directing respondents 2 and 3 to give adequate police protection to the petitioners and their men for carrying out the business (3) directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to cancel the registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act given to the first respondent Association and (4) also for injunction against the first respondent.

4. Shri. K. A. Nair, learned counsel for the petitioners and the Advocate General who took notice on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 have been heard. The submission on behalf of the petitioners can be summarised thus:

The petitioners have the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. The first respondent has no authority to interfere with the management functions. The first respondent Association registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926 enjoys privileges and immunities under that Act. It is an organisation commanding vast power. The Union has public duties and obligations read in the light of the dynamics of legal control. If a Company registered under the Companies Act and a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act are amenable to writ jurisdiction, there is no reason why Trade Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Article 226 of the Constitution has been couched in the widest amplitude in that the High Court is empowered to issue appropriate writ against any person. The expression "any person" is capable of embracing not only the persons wielding authority or power in the Government or local bodies, but any other person incorporate like the first respondent or its members. The Trade Union now-a-days is a new leviathan wielding high powers and can be equated as State or other authority.

The third petitioner as a citizen of India has a right to free movement anywhere in India and also to earn livelihood. If he is prevented from doing business on behalf of the first petitioner and his personal liberty is threatened by the members of the first respondent it will be violation of Art.21 of the Constitution of India.

5. The learned Advocate General submitted that the fundamental rights are against State action only. The constitutional safeguards directed against the State and its organs could be enforced under Art.226 while protection against violation of rights by individual has to be dealt with under the ordinary law. It is a misconception to think that constitutional safeguards are directed aga