The existence of sufficient cause for condonation of delay is essential for admitting an appeal presented beyond the prescribed period. The Appellate Authority must apply its mind to all the facts and circumstances of the case.

1. The first respondent filed an application, O.A. No. 825 of 1978 against the petitioner under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 for purchase of kudikidappa rights. The application was opposed by the petitioner. After due trial, the application was dismissed by the order, Ext.P1 dated 30th July, 1979. Long afterwards the first respondent filed an appeal against this order before the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Alleppey, the 3rd respondent herein en 24-7-1985. The appeal was thus filed almost six years after the date of the eider of the Land Tribunal. There was therefore a petition for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit, a copy of which is Ext.P2.

The petition does not clearly specify the extent of the delay. The reason stated by the first respondent for the delay was that he was out of the country since June, 1979 and that he came back to Alleppey only towards the beginning of 1985 and it was thereafter that he came to know of the dismissal of his application, from the office of the advocate.

2. The application for condonation was opposed by the petitioner by filing a counter statement, Ext.P3 in which the various allegations made by the first respondent were traversed. The application for condonation of delay was heard on 16-10-1985 and an order is stated to have been passed on 29-10-1985 condoning the delay. The appeal itself was thereafter posted for hearing on 12-11-1985 and it was disposed of by the aider Ext.P4 on 9-12-1985 allowing the appeal and remanding the matter for fresh disposal to the Land Tribunal.

3. The petitioner had meanwhile applied for a copy of the order dated 29-10-1985. But it is stated that till this date the copy has not been furnished to him. The petitioner's case is that there was absolutely no ground for condonation of the delay and that the appellate authority namely the 3rd respondent had not applied its mind to the facts of the case relating to the condonation application.

4. The files relating to the matter were produced before me by the learned Government Pleader, who appeared on behalf of the 3rd respondent, Appellate Authority. There is also a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent in which it is stated that there is to separate order dated 29-10-1985 on I.A. No. 70 of 1985, which happens to be the petition for condonation of delay. I shall extract the sentence in the counter (which because of the use of the double negative, has a dubious meaning):

"But no separate orders dated 29-10-1985 on I.A. No.70/85 is not seen in the case records."

A perusal of the file shows that the only order passed on 29-10-1985 was "Delay condoned", and then posting the appeal for hearing to 12-11-1985.

5. An application for condonation of delay is one to be dealt with in a quasi judicial manner. S.102 of the Land Reforms Act requires an appeal to be filed before the Appellate Authority within the period specified, but the Appellate Authority is given the discretion to hear an appeal presented beyond the prescribed period, if it is satisfied that the appellant bad sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within that period. The existence of sufficient cause, which has gat to be made out by the appellant, is the sine qua non for admitting an appeal presented beyond the period limited for it. It is for the appellant to seek condonation of the delay and admission of the appeal beyond the prescribed period and to place the facts and the evidence in support of his case.

It is well established that each day's delay has got to be explained before the appellant becomes entitled to admission of the appeal beyond the period prescribed. The existence or otherwise of sufficient cause has got to be tested objectively with reference to the facts disclosed. The Appellate Authority has to bear in mind that a right to have the order impugned treated as final accrues to the opposite party on the expiry of the period of time prescribed for filing the appeal. If that right i