The execution court's role is to execute the decree and not question its legality or correctness, except in cases where the decree is found to be a nullity due to lack of inherent jurisdiction of the court. Events occurring after the decree generally cannot be considered by the execution court unless there is legal sanction for doing so.

1. In execution of a decree declaring a right of way as an easement of necessity and allowing consequential reliefs, the decree-holders took steps to carve out the way provided in the decree by the issue of a commission. Judgment-debtors objected on the ground that subsequent to the decree the easement of necessity ceased to exist by the decree-holder acquiring another way by the purchase of an adjacent property and therefore the decree has become unexecutable. That contention was rejected by the execution court which held that it cannot go behind the decree. Judgment debtors have come up in revision challenging that order.

2. Whether there was acquisition of an adjacent property after the decree by the decree-holder providing another access to the dominant tenement of the decree-holder itself is a moot point on a question of fact. A decision on that aspect and a consequent finding that the decree has become unexecutable by cessation of the easement of necessity declared by the decree are conditions precedent to accepting the objection that the decree has become unexecutable. The question for consideration is whether the execution court can go to that extent.

3. Easement of necessity arises on the severance of tenements by transfer inter vivos, bequest or partition as envisaged in clauses (a), (c) and (e) of S.13 of Indian Easements Act, 1882. Transferor, transferee, testator, legatee or sharer, of a portion of an undivided estate in any of the above cases is entitled to such an easement provided it is necessary for enjoying the subject of transfer, bequest or partition and in the case of a testator for enjoyment of what remains with him. For that purpose no express provision in the document making a grant is necessary because the rationale or the legal basis of it is not any express grant but an implied grant as of necessity for enjoyment. Lands could be conveniently enjoyed in many cases only if the owner is able to have access to it and therefore the doctrine of implied grant is to meet the necessity of a particular case to avoid land lock. Law prescribes an easement by implied grant in such cases only to the extent of absolute necessity and not for convenient or reasonable enjoyment. The right is only in cases where without it the tenement cannot be used at all. It is the outcome of the former jointness which was severed resulting in necessity of fresh access. When property is conveyed which is so situate relatively to that from which it has been severed that it cannot be enjoyed without a particular privilege in or over the land of the grantor, the grant of it is implied and passes over without any express words. The word 'necessary' will have to be construed in its ordinary sense. When there is another means by which there is access the question of such an easement will not arise at all because 'necessity' implies that it is not a rule of convenience. Mere common ownership and subsequent severance will not create an implied grant.

4. The English Law on this aspect is more or less akin to the Indian Law. As observed in 130 English Reports 233 the way of necessity is limited to the necessity which created it, and ceases, if at any subsequent period the party entitled to it can approach the place to which it led, by passing over his land. Easement of necessity must terminate when the necessity ceases. A way of necessity is extinguished when the necessity terminated by the dominant owner acquiring adjoining property through which he can pass and repass to the old dominant tenement without reference to the servient tenement. When once the right is thus extinguished it may be capable of revival hot not by a unilateral act on the part of the beneficiary. This position has been recognised by Indian decisions also as evidenced by the decision in Venkatapathiraju v. Subbaraju (AIR 1930 Madras 789). This principle has been given statutory recognition under S.41 of the Indian Easements Act which provides that an easement of