Judges : T.KOCHU THOMMEN,RADHAKRISHNA MENON
A.K.NANU - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA - Respondent
Case No : W.A. No. 170,198, 222 of 1987
Decided On : 11/02/1987
Advocates Appeared :
M.C. Sen; For Appellants Government Pleader; M.P.R. Nair; For Respondents
Limitation Act - Debt Recovery - Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 - SRO. No. 797/79 - Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M S.T. Co., AIR 1933 P C 63 - New Delhi Mplty. v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637 - Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 - Sri. Narain v. Union Bank, AIR 1924 Lahore 53.54 - Offl. Liqr. Palai Central Bank Ltd. v. Augasti, 1966 KLT 411 - Raghavan v. Narayanan,1986 KLT 10 - ESI Corporation v. Ramdas Reddiar,1980 KLT 425 - Kunhamina Umma v. Paru Amma, 1967 KLT 596
Fact of the Case:
The court considered the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to debt recoverable under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. The question was whether a bank could recover a debt under the Act after the period prescribed under the Limitation Act had expired.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the debt is not recoverable under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 once the period prescribed for recovery under the Limitation Act has expired. The Act only provides for easy recovery, not recovery at any time.
Issues: The main issue was whether a time-barred debt is recoverable under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on various precedents and held that the Act does not create a substantive right to recover time-barred debts. It only provides a special procedure for enforcing existing liabilities.
Final Decision: The court set aside the judgment under appeal, quashed the orders impugned in the Original Petitions, and allowed the appeals with no costs.
1. These appeals arise from the common judgment in OP Nos. 6991, 6999 and 6992 of 1986 whereby the learned judge held that, in respect of a debt recoverable by recourse to the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (the "Act"), the bar of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 was inapplicable The learned judge stated:
"As long as the right is not extinguished and no period is prescribed for resorting to the proceedings for recovery under the Act the fact that a suit is barred will not disentitle the Bank from resorting to steps in pursuance to the notification by proceeding under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act"
The provisions of the Act have been made applicable by SRO. No. 797/79 to the recovery of loans advanced by a bank to a person for agriculture or agricultural purposes. It is open to the bank to recover such debts by recourse to the summary procedure under the Act instead of having recourse to the elaborate and time-consuming procedure provided under the Civil Procedure Code. The question, however, is whether the debt is recoverable under the Act at any time the bank chooses to recover it or is the bank, as in the case of a civil suit, shut out of remedy once the period prescribed under the Limitation Act has expired.
2. Counsel for the appellants submits that, in the absence of any provision in the Act creating a substantive right and a substantive liability, an amount which is no longer payable by the debtor by reason of the bar of limitation is no longer due from the debtor or recoverable under the Act. The Act creates a special mode of recovery, but does not create any right to recover the amount outside the period of limitation. A time-barred debt, counsel submits, is not recoverable under the Act.
3. Counsel for the respondent-bank contends that the object of the Act is to recover in public interest any amount in respect of which the creditor has a right to recover and the debtor has a duty to pay. The Act by providing a special remedy enables the creditor to recover even time-barred debts. So long as the substantive right of the bank and the corresponding substantive obligation of the debtor by reason of the loan are not extinguished, the remedy to recover the loan is preserved by the Act. The Limitation Act, therefore, has, according to counsel, no application.
4. Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M S.T. Co., AIR 1933 P C 63 was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in New Delhi Mplty. v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1976 SC 1637. Adopting the principle laid down by the Privy Council, the Supreme Court stated that a time-barred debt could not be recovered merely by reason of the special mode of recovery provided by a special enactment. What was recoverable was only money payable, i.e., money legally recoverable, and not money the recovery of which is barred by limitation.
The Court stated that S.7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 only provided a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and did not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. In AIR 1933 PC 63, 66, the Privy Council observed:
"....And their Lordships are satisfied that the position in this respect is, in India, the same as in this country, for the reason that in view of the place and context in which these words are found, they must be confined in their Lordships' judgment to money due and recoverable in a suit by the company, and they do not include any moneys which at the date of the application under the section could not have been so recovered." (emphasis supplied).
See also Sri. Narain v. Union Bank, AIR 1924 Lahore 53.54; Offl. Liqr. Palai Central Bank Ltd. v. Augasti, 1966 KLT 411; and Raghavan v. Narayanan,1986 KLT 10.
5. Counsel for the bank, however, contends that S.71, as does S.68, of the Act refers to money "due". This means that so long as the amount is due, even if the recovery of that money is barred in general law, remedy
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