The main legal point established in the judgment is that judicial work done by civil courts during vacation is not inherently invalid, and the jurisdiction of the District Judge to hear cases and pass orders during vacation is determined by the relevant statutory provisions.

1. During the mid summer vacation in 1987. District Judge. Tellicherry heard arguments in a Rent Control Revision petition and pronounced order. The main ground on which the said order is challenged in this Original Petition under Art.227 of the Constitution is that the order is null and void as the District judge has no jurisdiction to hear cases. or to pass orders. other than as a vacation judge.

2. A short resume of facts would be beneficial to appreciate the rival contentions. A landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant before the Rent Control Court on two different grounds under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965. One of the grounds is that the tenant has sublet the building without the consent of the landlord. The Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction on that ground. but the Appellate Authority reversed the finding and dismissed the petition. The aggrieved landlord filed a revision petition under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. When the case was posted for 8-4-1987 counsel for the tenant was not ready. but he submitted that the case can be posted during vacation. As the other side bad no objection to the aforesaid course. the revision was posted to a date during mid summer vacation. On 18-4-1987 arguments on both sides were heard and the District Judge pronounced the order on 25-4-1987 by allowing the revision and restoring the Rent Control Court's order.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) urged two points. The first is that the District Judge erred in exercising his jurisdiction by interfering with the finding of the Appellate Authority that there was no subletting. The second is that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear cases during vacation and to pass orders. There is no merit in the first point urged as the District Judge has only acted within the limits of his revisional powers. Therefore. no disturbance of the order need be made under Art.227 of the Constitution. On the second point counsel on both sides addressed detailed arguments. Therefore. I proceed to consider those arguments.

4. Government appoint a District Judge in accordance with S.3(2) of the Kerala Civil Courts Act. 1956 (for short 'the Act'). for each District Court. Additional District Judges are appointed under S.4(1) of the Act and sub-section (2) empowers an Additional District Judge to discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge in respect of matters assigned to him by the District Judge. While discharging those functions. an Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. S.19(1) of the Act provides that the High Court may permit the civil courts under its control to adjourn from time to time for periods not exceeding in the aggregate sixty days in each year". Sub-section(2) empowers the High Court to make provisional orders in all urgent matters. The said sub-section stands amended by Act 33 of 1986. The sub-section now stands reads thus:

"(2) During the adjournment of a civil court the High Court shall nominate a District Judge for each District. who shall have the power to make provisional orders on all urgent matters and for such purpose. appeals. plaints and petitions and other matters which would ordinarily be presented to such civil court shall be received in the District Court and any such order shall. except on matters to be presented in the District Court itself. remain in force until such matter has been beard and decided by the court having jurisdiction and in the case of orders passed on matters to be presented in the District Court itself. such order shall be an order passed by a court having jurisdiction".

A reading of the said sub-section shows the following features: (1) The provisional orders made by the nominated District Judge on all urgent matters shall remain in force until such matters had been beard and decided by the court having jurisdiction. (2) The provisional du