The main legal point established in the judgment is that a party cannot simultaneously pursue both the appeal and revisional remedy under the Co-operative Societies Act. The court clarified the concept of an appeal and emphasized that even a rejected appeal is considered an appeal in the eyes of the law.

1. An important question concerning the construction of S.82 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") arises for decision in this writ appeal. The question is: When could it be said that an award of an Arbitrator had been made the subject-matter of an appeal before the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal?

2. The appellant-writ petitioner was a party to a dispute before the Arbitrator appointed under the Act. The decision turned out to be adverse to him. Aggrieved by that decision, he filed an appeal. That was, however, beyond the prescribed time. A petition for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was duly considered by the Appellate Tribunal. The intrinsic contradictions in the application were such that the Tribunal was not convinced of any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. That circumstance, however, did not dash the hopes of the appellant. He attempted to salvage his cause successfully as it then turned out by a revision under S.84. He was, initially, confronted with a preliminary plea that the revision was not maintainable. The Tribunal, however, overruled it. Later it went into the merits, and decided the matter to the substantial satisfaction of the appellant. It followed, as a corollary, that the Society was, in equal measure, unsatisfied with the revisional decision of the Tribunal. The two orders of the Tribunal, the preliminary one sustaining the maintainability of the revision, and the later one on merits, were both challenged before this Court.

3. The learned single judge took the view that the revision was not maintainable. Consequently the revisional orders of the Tribunal were quashed. It is this judgment of the learned single judge that is attacked in the appeal.

4. Having regard to the limited nature of the issue involved, it is only necessary to advert to such of those provisions of the Act which have a bearing on and relevance to the issue under consideration.

5. As is well-known, disputes between the members of the Society, or between a member and the Society, and the like, are statutorily consigned for adjudication by an Arbitrator. That decision, however, is not the final one. Appeals are provided against the decision, some appeals to the Government and some to the Tribunal. Even as regards the remedy before a Tribunal, a dichotomy is maintained. The Tribunal is also invested with a power of review, subject to the conditions contained in that behalf. Provisions with which we are directly concerned are S.82 and 84. The former provides for an appeal to the Tribunal. A time limit of sixty days is prescribed for such appeal. R.106 provides for rejection of an appeal in respect of which defects pointed out remain uncured. There is no specific provision for condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal. As regards a revision before the same Tribunal, situations are somewhat different. No time limit is prescribed in filing a revision. That, however, does not mean that it is not conditional upon other factors. Those factors are made mention of in sub-section (b) of S.84. That sub-section reads:

"Provided that the Tribunal shall not take any action under this section if

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(b) the decision or order has been made the subject matter of an appeal:"

An examination of these provisions would reveal that the legislature had conferred two remedies on a person aggrieved by the award of an Arbitrator, the choice of which was entirely dependent upon the preference of the party. The underlying idea of conferring the appellate and revisional power in the same authority, is not easily understandable. Similarly, a fixation of an inflexible time limit for preferring an appeal on the one hand and the absolute absence of any time factor in relation to the invocation or exercise of the revisional power, may also appear to be eluding logical explanatory base. The Court is not, however, concerned with the inartistic draftsmanship of a statutory provision. The di