The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of 'good faith' for the Ninth Exception to S. 499 of the I.P.C., the standard of proof for establishing good faith, and the interpretation of 'publication' in the context of communication to an advocate on behalf of his client.

Sri P. R. Ramakrishnan, an advocate, was convicted for the offence of defamation under S. 500 of the I.P.C. The trial court sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The Sessions Court confirmed the conviction, but reduced the sentence to Rs. 250/- Sri Ramakrishnan filed the present revision. During the pendency of this revision, Sri. Ramakrishnan passed away and his wife and children got impleaded as parties. The foundation of this criminal case is a reply which Sri. Ramakrishnan sent to the first respondent's lawyer on 2-2-1974. It was a reply to a notice sent by the aforesaid counsel to Sri Ramakrishnan. The said reply contained imputations which are per se libelous. The criminal proceedings commenced twelve years ago did not culminate even with the death of the accused. For the sake of convenience, Sri. Ramakrishnan will be referred to as 'the accused' hereinafter and the respondent will be referred to as the 'complainant.'

2. The complainant was a foreman of a chit fund scheme and the accused was one of the subscribers in a kuri piloted by the foreman. The complainant's lawyers issued a notice to the accused demanding money due from the latter. Ext. P1 is the reply sent by the accused for himself as well as on behalf of his wife. Allegations were made in Ext. P1 regarding the manner in which the complainant conducted kuri business. There is no dispute now on the point that those allegations are per se defamatory. Hence, it is not necessary to reproduce those imputations here.

3. Two questions were raised in this revision. The first is, whether there was publication of Ext. P1 notice. The second is, whether, the Ninth Exception to S. 499 of the I.P.C. was available, to the defence I shall first consider the argument based on the Ninth Exception. The Exception reads thus :

"It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it or, of any other person or for the public good."

The primary requisite to attract the Exception is "good faith". Other requisites need be considered only if the primary requisite has been made out. Out of the ten exceptions enumerated in S. 499 of the I.P.C., the First and the Fourth Exceptions do not mention the good faith aspect, but in all other exceptions emphasis is given to good faith in making the imputation. It has a connotation in the I.P.C. which is well defined, in S. 52 "Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention". The person who makes the imputation must take due care and attention before making or publishing the imputation. Whether a person took due care and attention before he made the imputation is a matter most often within the special knowledge of that person himself. When the allegation against an accused consists of per se defamatory imputations, the court will presume absence of the exception by virtue of S. 105 of the Evidence Act. The onus is on the personto rebut the Act. The onus can be discharged by showing that he made due enquiries before he published the imputation. It is not enough to show that the enquiry made by him was only a make-believe, one or that a slip-shod attention was paid to the matter. The words "care and attention" are qualified by the term "due" and therefore the degree of care expected is what a reasonable man would do in a reasonable manner. It is not necessary to show that the enquiry made by him was so fool-proof or exhaustive, or so threadbare that any possibility of error or chance of any mistake is ruled out therein. However, the onus of proof will not be discharged merely by showing that he acted on the information given to him by another. He must show that the source or sources on which he acted were the proper sources and that he acted on the said sources with a reasonable degree of circumspection and that he has reasonable grounds to belie