The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for clear and unequivocal proof of knowledge of the court's order to establish contempt of court, as well as the high degree of proof required to punish for civil contempt by reason of the alleged disobedience of the court's order.

Headnote:
Contempt of Court - Alleged Contempt by Defendants - Order XXXIX R.2A C. P. C. - I.A. Nos. 631 and 635 of 1983 - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code (C. P. C.) and emphasized the importance of clear and unequivocal proof of knowledge of the court's order to establish contempt of court. The court referred to legal principles from Dushnath Prasad (Shaw) v. Krishna Kishore Mukhoadphyay, Aligarh Municipality v E. T, Mazdoor Union, Exparte Langley, Exparte Smith, In re Bishop, and Churchman v. Shop Stewards to highlight the high degree of proof required to punish for civil contempt by reason of the alleged disobedience of the court's order.
Fact of the Case:

The case involved an appeal arising from a common order in I. A Nos. 631 and 635 of 1983. It related to the alleged contempt committed by defendants 10 to 17 in a suit for obtaining renewal of the lease of a property and for consequential reliefs. The defendants were found guilty of violation of the court's order and were imposed with punishment. The appeal addressed the question of whether the defendants had knowledge of the order of the appellate court granting a stay.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the charge of contempt and the finding thereon by the lower appellate court were totally unfounded and unsustainable. It also concluded that the order in I.A. No.635 of 1983 was made without any evidence whatsoever. Additionally, the court held that the order in I.A. No.631 of 1983 was prematurely passed and prejudged the issue in the appeal pending before the court.
Issues: The main issue was whether the defendants had knowledge of the order of the appellate court granting a stay and whether the lower court's orders were made without sufficient evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the importance of clear and unequivocal proof of knowledge of the court's order to establish contempt of court. It highlighted the high degree of proof required to punish for civil contempt by reason of the alleged disobedience of the court's order.
Final Decision: The appeal from the common order in I.A.Nos. 631 and 635 of 1983 was allowed, and the orders in I.A. No.635 of 1983 and I.A. No.631 of 1983 were set aside. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.

Judgment :-

1. This appeal arises from the common order in I. A Nos. 631 and 635 of 1983. We shall first deal with I.A. No. 635 of 1983 which relates to the alleged contempt committed by defendants 10 to 17 in O. S. No. 3 of 1981 of the Sub Court, Pathanamthitta. That suit was instituted by the respondent, the Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd. against defendants 1 to 9, being the legal representatives of the deceased Jacob, and defendants 10 to 17, being the legal representatives of the deceased Thomas. That suit was for obtaining renewal of the lease of the suit property and for consequential reliefs. The suit was dismissed with a direction that the plaintiff should remove its bunk, pump and tank from suit premises within one month from the date of the decree. An appeal was filed by the plaintiff in the District Court, Quilon which was numbered on 11-4-1983 as A S No. 49 of 1983. On that day Shri. C. P. Parameswaran Pillai, counsel for the 15th defendant, Shri. Baby Thomas (also known as Unnithan alias Babu) filed vakkalath. The case stood posted to 13-4-1983. A temporary stay of operation of the direction of the Sub Court was ordered by the District Court in I. A. No. 461 of 1983 on 13-4-1983. That order reads as follows:

"Further time for counter. Until further order the direction of the lower court to the appellant will stand stayed. For counter and hearing to 18-6-1983."

2. On 6-4-1983 defendants 10 to 17 filed execution application contending that, notwithstanding the direction of the court, the plaintiff failed to remove the bunk, pump and tank within the stipulated time. On 11-4-1983 the plaintiff filed objections stating that an appeal had been contemplated. On 14-4-1983 the application of defendants 10 to 17 for execution was allowed by the Sub Court. The Amin acted immediately and removed the bunk, pump and tank. He filed a report to that effect in the Sub Court on 16-4-1983. It is on that day, that is, 16-4-1983, that the order of the District Court was communicated to the Sub-Court.

3. The plaintiff moved the present I. As. from which the appeal arises. I.A.No. 631 of 1983 is for compensation for loss caused to the plaintiff by reason of the action of defendants 10 to 17 in executing the order of the Sub Court. I. A. No. 635 of 1983 is for punishment of defendants 10 to 17 under Order XXXIX R.2A C. P. C. for violation of the order of stay issued by the District Court. The District Court found defendants 10 to 17 guilty of violation of the court's order and imposed the punishment of attaching the properties of defendants 10 to 17 and committing defendants 10 to 16 to civil prison for a period of two months. The 17th defendant being a woman was not committed to prison. That order has not been executed because of an interim order of stay granted by this Court.

4. The sole question which arises in regard to the alleged contempt is whether or not on the relevant date, that is, 14-4-1983, and on the previous day, defendants 10 to 17 had knowledge of the order of the appellate court granting a stay. The only evidence on the point is the testimony of PWl who is the Divisional Manager of the plaintiff. He does not say that he saw anyone of the defendants 10 to 17 in court. All that he says is that the plaintiff's counsel in Ernakulam Shri. Sugunapalan had been told by the plaintiff's counsel in Quilon that defendants 10 to 17 were present in court on 13-4-1983. Neither Shri. Sugunapalan nor the plaintiff's counsel in Quilon was examined on this point. Nor was counsel for defendants 10 to 17 cited by the plaintiff to examine whether anyone of these defendants was present in court on the relevant day or whether counsel communicated the information to all or anyone of them in time. Their counsel Shri. C. P. Parameswaran Pillai, who is a very senior member of the bar, could have been cited by the plaintiff for reliable information as to whether there was communication of the order to defendants 10 to 17 in time so as to character

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Judicial Analysis