1985 Supreme(Ker) 99
Judges : K.BHASKARAN,BALAKRISHNA MENON,V.SIVARAMAN NAIR
RADHAKRISHNAN - Appellant
Versus
JAYAKUMARI - Respondent
Case No : Second A. No. 966 of 1979-D
Decided On : 04/11/1985
Advocates Appeared :
K. Sudhakaran; V.R. Raveendran; For Appellant P. Sukumaran Nair; For Respondent
The main legal point established in the judgment is that animus is not required to be established to prove desertion for the purpose of S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act.
Headnote:
The case involved a question of whether animus is required to be established to prove desertion for the purpose of S.18 (2) (a) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The court held that animus is not required to be established, and the expression 'desertion' in the context of the claim for maintenance by the wife, deserted or neglected, does not necessitate proving animus. The court emphasized the significance of the clarification in regard to the expression 'desertion' and highlighted the legislative policy behind the rigidity in the matter of proof. The court also emphasized the need to construe the provisions liberally bearing in mind the objects sought to be achieved and the mischiefs intended to be curbed.
Fact of the Case:
The first plaintiff claimed maintenance for herself and her minor child from the defendant, who had abandoned them without reasonable cause. The trial Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the first appellate Court upheld the decision. The sole question of law in the second appeal was whether animus was required to prove desertion under S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that animus is not required to be established to prove desertion for the purpose of S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act. It emphasized the significance of the clarification in regard to the expression 'desertion' and highlighted the legislative policy behind the rigidity in the matter of proof. The court dismissed the second appeal with costs.
Issues: The main issue was whether animus was required to be established to prove desertion under S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that animus is not required to be established to prove desertion for the purpose of S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act. It emphasized the significance of the clarification in regard to the expression 'desertion' and highlighted the legislative policy behind the rigidity in the matter of proof. The court also emphasized the need to construe the provisions liberally bearing in mind the objects sought to be achieved and the mischiefs intended to be curbed.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the second appeal with costs.
1. The question of law, raised in the suit and the first and second appeals, which gave rise to the reference of the matter to the Full Bench, is whether for the purpose of S.18 (2) (a) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, (78 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Maintenance Act.) animus is required to be established to prove desertion.
2. The brief facts leading to this second appeal could be stated as follows:- The first plaintiff Sathyabhama Jayakumari, on behalf of herself and her minor child, 2nd plaintiff, instituted a suit claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100/- and Rs. 50/-per month respectively for herself and the 2nd plaintiff, from the defendant, Raghavan Radhakrishnan, who had married her on 12-11-1973. The 2nd plaintiff was born in that wedlock on 11-8-1974. The first plaintiff was residing with the defendant till 23-3-1974 on which date she left for her parents' home for confinement. The trial Court found that the defendant had abandoned the plaintiffs without reasonable cause, and decreed the suit as prayed for.
3. The main ground taken in the first appeal was that the trial Court was in error in finding that the defendant had deserted his wife, and the offer by him to maintain the plaintiffs was not bona fide. The first appellate Court found that there was no ground to interfere with the decree passed by the trial Court, and dismissed the appeal. Hence this second appeal.
4. The sole question of law that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether, for the purpose of desertion under S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act, there was a burden cast on the plaintiffs to prove not only that her husband had deserted her (and her child) but also that he did so with the animus in that behalf. S.18 (2) (a) of the Maintenance Act reads as follows:
"2. A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance.
(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her;"
On a plain reading of the section, it is not possible to take a view that to constitute desertion under Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Maintenance Act, not only desertion but desertion with the animus to do so has to be established by the plaintiffs in a suit for maintenance. It has to be noticed that S.18 of the Maintenance Act has been enacted exclusively for the benefit of the Hindu wife, who might be required to live separately from her husband; and clause (a) of sub-section (2) thereof provides that if a Hindu wife lives separately from her husband; for that reason alone she would not forfeit her right to claim maintenance in case her husband is guilty of desertion without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish or wilfully neglecting her. The Parliament has taken care to make clear what in the context the expression ' desertion' means. The expression 'that is to say' of abandoning her after the word 'desertion' is of great significance. The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra (A.I. R.1976 S.C. 800) has explained the implication of the words 'that is to say', as follows:
"Ordinarily, the expression'that is to say', is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word'includes' is generally employed. In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words 'that is to say', the expression may be followed by illustrative instances. The precise meaning of the words 'that is to say' must vary with the context."
Whatever might be the dictionary meaning, or, for that matter, the meaning assigned to that expression in any other enactment, so far as clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Maintenance Act is concerned, 'abandoning the wife without reason