The main legal point established in the judgment is the mandatory nature of the proviso to S.167(2) of the CrPC, which entitles the accused to be released on bail after the prescribed period of authorized detention, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the stage of investigation.

1. This application under S.437 and 439 read with S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed by accused 1, 3 and 4 in Crime No. 201 of 1985 of the Quilon East Police Station for being enlarged on bail. The case was registered against them along with the 2nd accused for having committed offences punishable under S.302 and 201 read with S.34 of the Indian Penal Code alleging murder of Francis alias Vinu, a boy aged 18, said to be the son of the third accused as well as for having caused disappearance of evidence. Third accused is the sister of accused 1 and 2 and 4th accused is their mother.

2. Petitioners were arrested on 14-6-1985 at 9.15 p.m. and produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate. Quilon on 15-6-1985 at 8.30 p m. Second accused surrendered before the Magistrate on 8-7-1985. Their bail applications were rejected by the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge and this Court on earlier occasions. The petitioners moved the Magistrate for their release on bail as provided under S.167(2) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By order dated 17-9-1985, the Magistrate dismissed the application on the ground that he was informed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor that this Court gave some directions while rejecting their previous bail applications and therefore without producing that order it may not be safe to release them on bail. Hence they came up before this Court.

3. S.167(2) and the proviso reads as follows:

"The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that

(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if be is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so. but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; x x x"

4. The first question for consideration in this respect is the point of time when the petitioners are entitled to be released as of right after the expiry of ninety days authorised detention under S 167(2)(a)(i) I am proceeding to discuss this aspect only because Mr. M. N. Sukumaran Nayar, Advocate for the petitioners, contended that ninety days of authorised detention was over by 12-9-1985, while the Public Prosecutor argued that it was over only by 8.30 p.m on 13-9-1985. The Public Prosecutor further contended that by 8.30 p. m. on 13-9-1985, when the period of authorised detention of ninety days under S.167 (2) (a) (i) was over, the office hours which extends only upto 5 p.m. already ran out and hence the final report, even if

filed on 14-9-1985, was within time. He also argued that the charge was filed on 16-9-1985 and it must be considered to be within time because 14-9-1985 and 15-9-1985 were public holidays.

5. I do not think that there is much merit in the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor. There was no dispute on the question that the period of ninety days or sixty days, as the case may be, u