The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Land Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide whether there is a lease protected under Section 106 of Act 1 of 1964, and a decision without reference to the Tribunal would be without jurisdiction and null and void.

Headnote:
lease - property rights - Act 1 of 1964, Section 106, Section 125 - The court discussed the interpretation and application of Section 106 and Section 125 of Act 1 of 1964, which relate to special provisions relating to leases for commercial or industrial purposes and the bar of jurisdiction of civil courts, respectively. The court emphasized that Section 125(3) confers jurisdiction on the Land Tribunal to decide whether there is a lease protected under Section 106, and a decision without reference to the Tribunal would be without jurisdiction and null and void. The court also highlighted the limited finality to the orders of the Land Tribunal and the partial exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts under Section 125(3).
Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, a minor at the time, filed a suit seeking permission to deposit the value of a theatre payable to the 1st defendant and be in exclusive possession of the property, contending that the transaction was a licence, not a lease. The first defendant resisted, claiming the transaction was a lease for a commercial purpose and that the plaintiff's rights had been lost under Act 20 of 1971.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the first defendant was in possession only as a licensee and not as a lessee, and was not entitled to the benefit of Section 106 of Act 1/1964. The court also held that the lower court's finding that there was only a licence and not a lease was without jurisdiction.
Issues: The main issue was whether the transaction was a lease or a licence, and whether the lower court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute regarding tenancy.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that Section 125(3) confers jurisdiction on the Land Tribunal to decide whether there is a lease protected under Section 106, and a decision without reference to the Tribunal would be without jurisdiction and null and void.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the lower court was set aside, and the matter was sent back to the lower court for a fresh decision after referring the question regarding the rights of the first defendant and his legal representatives as tenants under Act 1 of 1964 to the Land Tribunal.

Judgment :-

1. Defendants 3 to 5, the legal representative of the first defendant are the appellants.

2. When the plaintiff was a minor, his grandmother and mother acting as guardian entrusted the plaint property, about 54 cents of land, to one Chockalingam Pillai for the construction of a Cinema Theatre on 19-11-1947 (Ext. BI). The rights of Chockalingam Pillai became vested in the 1st defendant and now have devolved on defendants 3 to 5 after his death. The plaintiff contends that the transaction is not a lease, but only a licence. He therefore filed the suit for a direction that he be permitted to deposit Rs. 51,309/-, the value of the theatre payable to the 1st defendant and then allow him to be in exclusive possession of the property and for other reliefs;

3. The first defendant resisted the claim contending that the transaction was a lease of land for a commercial purpose, the lessee constructed a Cinema Theatre for such commercial purpose and therefore is entitled to the protection under S.106 of Act 1 of 1964. There was also a further contention that the land was registered as Sree Pandaravaka land in the revenue records and the plaintiff's rights, if any, have been lost by orders passed under the Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting and Enfranchisement) Act, 1971, Act 20 of 1971.

4. The court below found that the first defendant was in possession only as a licencee and not as a lessee, he was not entitled to the benefit of S.106 of Act 1/1964 and that as he was thus not a landholder, Act 20/ 71 could not divest the plaintiff's right and vest it in the first defendant.

5. Even though the appellants have assailed all the findings of the lower court, their learned counsel, Sri. C. K. Sivasankara Panicker placed on the forefront of his submission a question of jurisdiction relying on the Full Bench ruling of five judges in Kasava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat (1979 KLT. 766). He contended that the court below had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute regarding tenancy and the matter should have been referred to the Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of Act 1/1964; the lower court's finding that there was only a licence and not a, lease was thus without jurisdiction. We are considering only this contention in this appeal.

6. The plaintiff's counsel, Sri. Vyasan Poti met this contention by stating that there need not be any reference to the Land Tribunal when the contention is based on S.106 of the Act. He elaborates by explaining that the Land Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide only those disputes which are expressly required by the Act to be decided by the Tribunal as contemplated in S.125(1) and no provision of the Act enjoins the Land Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant under S.106 of the Act or not. If, therefore, the Land Tribunal has no such jurisdiction, there can be no reference under S.125(3) Moreover S.125(3) only prescribes the procedure while S 125(1) affects jurisdiction and a procedural law cannot confer jurisdiction. In any case he contended that this court, in appeal can decide the question of tenancy.

7. Let us read S.106 and 125 of Act 1 of 1964.

"106. Special provisions relating to leases for commercial or industrial purposes. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law, or in any contract, or in any order or decree of court, where on any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose, the lessee has constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 20th May, 1961, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land, but shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of tenancy, and such rent shall be liable to be varied every twelve years.

Explanation:- For the purposes of this section,

(a) 'lessee' includes a legal representative or an assignee of the lessee; and

(b) "building" means a permanent or a temporary building and includes a shed.

(1A) The lessor or the lessee may apply to such authority as may be prescribed for varying the rent referred to in sub-section (

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Judicial Analysis