The court clarified the jurisdiction of the District Judge to decide the confiscation of the vehicle and established the principle that the confiscation of the vehicle would be illegal and unsustainable if the value of the contraband alleged to have been carried in the vehicle is negligible compared to the value of the vehicle.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment in OP. No. 6346 of 1983. The writ petition was for quashing Ext. P2 judgment of the 2nd respondent, the District Judge, Ernakulam, in CMA. No. 36 of 1983 dated 22-7-1983, reversing the order of confiscation of the tempo van involved in the case by the Divisional Forest Officer, Malayattur, the authorised officer under the Forest Act. The appellant was the hirer in respect of the vehicle. The authorised officer by his proceedings Ext. P1, ordered confiscation, as it was, according to him, found to carry contraband article, that is to say, timber which belonged to the Forest. On appeal, the District Judge, after having considered the evidence adduced before him, recorded the following findings:

"(i) The value of the Tempo Van used for the commission of the forest offence is Rs. 80,000/-whereas the value of the timber that was illicitly carried in the van is only Rs. 200/-;

(ii) The case of the registered owner of the van, the hirer and the driver that they have taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against the use of the van for committing the forest offence has been accepted by the Authorised Officer;

(iii) The cleaner who used the van for committing the forest offence, took away the van unauthorisedly at a time when the appellant and its permanent driver were away;

(iv) Since, the cleaner of the van had no badge for driving a public career, even though, he had a valid driving licence, it is clear that he has no right to drive the van at the relevant time and his act in driving the vehicle is an offence punishable under the Motor Vehicles Act;

And

(v) The version given by the cleaner before the Authorised Officer that he bona fide believed that the timber carried in the van was collected from an Estate, has not been rejected by the Authorised Officer:

And

(vi) There is no case for the Forest Officials that the cleaner of the van had driven the van in dispute at any time previously for transporting any material, and, thereby augmented the income of the appellant,"

It is to quash the decision based on these findings that the writ petition was filed. The learned judge formulated the following two questions for consideration:

(1) "Whether the District Judge sitting in appeal had jurisdiction to decide confiscation of the vehicle without the owner on the party array; and

(2) Whether the District Judge had committed any patent error in releasing the vehicle?"

2. On the question whether the District Judge sitting in appeal bad jurisdiction to decide confiscation of the vehicle, without the owner of the vehicle on the party array, with due respect, we regret, we are not in a position to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. We are of the opinion that the failure on the part of the appellant to implead the registered owner of the vehicle, as a party to the appeal, would not by itself oust the jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain and decide the appeal filed under S.61D of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, Act 4 of 1962 (the Act).

3. The said section provides thus:

"61D. Appeal. (1) Any person aggrieved by any order passed under S.61A or S.61C may, within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such order, appeal to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the property to which the order relates has been seized and the District Judge shall, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, pass such order as he may think fit confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against.

(2) An order of the District Judge under sub-section (1) shall be final."

The Section confers a right of appeal on any person aggrieved by any order passed under S.61A, and Ext. P1 order passed by the 3rd respondent, Divisional Forest Officer, being an order passed under S.61A of the Act, it could not be said that apart from the Authorised Officer who passed that order, any other person would be a necessary party to the appeal. We have not been sh