Any mark or form of signature indicating a conscious acknowledgment of liability would be sufficient to constitute a valid acknowledgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Limitation Act.

1. The plaintiff-appellant in the second appeal, lost his suit based on a promissory note. The court below took the view that the suit was barred by limitation.

2. The promissory note for Rs.5,300 was executed on 8-4-1972. The suit was instituted on 25-11-1976. On the date of the suit, a period of three years had clearly elapsed after the execution of the promissory note. In the absence of an acknowledgment of liability, the suit would therefore be barred.

3. Acknowledgment was pleaded by the plaintiff. There was a specific averment to the effect that the suit was not barred in view of the acknowledgment evident from the letters written by the defendant on 21-3-1973,4-8-1975 and 11-10-1975. In Para.4 of the written statement, the genuineness of the letter dated 21-3-1973 (Ext. A2) was disputed. The other documents were admitted to be correct.

4. According to the appellate court, the statements in Ext.A2 did not establish a reference to the transaction under the promissory note. A contention that the handwriting in Ext. A2 was similar to the handwriting in the admitted documents, and that the name in Ext.A2 would have been written by the defendant and that such a writing of name was sufficient to constitute signature, was also considered by that court. The court, however, observed:

"However, it is necessary that there should be a conscious acknowledgment"

According to the court, the absence of signature clearly signified that the defendant "did not intend to sign or verify the acknowledgment in the body of the document".

5. The view taken by the court below is not correct.

6. Whether the defendant had intended to acknowledge the liability or not is clearly ascertainable from the documentary evidence in the case. Even if the disputed document is excluded, the existence of a monetary transaction, the consciousness on the part of the defendant of his being under a financial obligation to the plaintiff, and the repetitive. assurances relating to payment of the amounts thus due to the plaintiff are clearly established. There could not be any doubt whatever that Ext.A2 had been written by the defendant in the case. The contents of Ext.A2, would clearly bring about the necessary nexus between the execution of the promissory note, and his intention to acknowledge the liability arising thereunder. It cannot then be said that for the only reason that the signature as such did not figure in Ext.A2, there was no acknowledgment. The legal position is clear in the light of the cantena of judicial decisions which have dealt with the question.

7. Cases starting from early times would show that any mark would be sufficient to constitute 'signature', if such a mark has the support of an intense intention. Case law here and abroad is referred to at pages 70-71 of 'The Negotiable Instruments Act' by Bhasuyam and Adiga (14th Edn.) Though in a different context the question has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526. The meaning of the term 'signed', in the background of a question arising under the Arbitration Act was considered therein. It was held that a full signature was not essential, for giving validity to an award of the Arbitrator. There are also some cases where a man is allowed to sign by the hand of another who writes his name for him. (See London County Council v. Agricultural Food Products Ltd. (1955) 2 Q. B. 218). That decision refers to to an illustration of such a signature, "when a man has broken his arm and cannot write his own name." In Dennison v. Jeffs, (1896) 1 Ch. 611, a husband signed on behalf of his wife, "in her presence, at her request, and by her authority." The signature was held to be sufficient to constitute the signature of the wife. Initials would be sufficient to constitute signature, as had been noted by the decisions reported in Meenakshi Achi v. P.S.M. Subramanian Chettiar, A.I.R. 1957 Madras 8 and Tevudu v. Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1935 Madras 555