The Act should be interpreted liberally, and there must be a casual connection between the employment and the worker's death to establish a compensable accident.

1. The 1st respondent, the widow of one Shri Bumo, filed an application, W.C.C. No. 356 of 1978, before the respondent, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Ernakulam, claiming compensation under S 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (the Act), from the appellant, on the allegation that her husband who was a headload worker, in the employment of the appellant, died on 2-5-1974, due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. That the 1st respondent's husband was an employee under the appellant who was during the material time a Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agent at Cochin, and that be (the 1st respondent's husband) died on 2-5-1974, are facts admitted by the appellant. The only question that required decision by the 2nd respondent was whether the death of the Ist respondent's husband was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

2. The second respondent-Commissioner had initially passed orders dismissing the application. This court, however, in appeal, set aside that order and remanded the matter to the 2nd respondent-Commissioner for fresh disposal according to law, and in the light of the observations contained in that judgment. The 2nd respondent-Commissioner, after the remand, having allowed the application as prayed for, this appeal has been preferred by the employer, who figured as the opposite party in the application before the 2nd respondent. At the time when the appeal was admitted, this Court had allowed the 1st respondent to withdraw Rs. 5,000/-out of the sum of Rs. 10,000/ -deposited by the appellant towards the compensation allowed in favour of the Ist respondent by the 2nd respondent.

3. On the side of the applicant before the Commissioner, Ww.1 to Ww. 5 were examined and the medical certificate, Ext. WI marked. On the side of the opposite party, Ow.1 to Ow. 4 were examined and Exts O1 to 04 were marked. The most important piece of evidence in the case was that of the co-worker of the husband of the 1st respondent herein. According to him, on 2-5-1974, there was urgent shipment and the Ist respondent's husband was carrying the cashew boxes even forgoing his lunch interval; it was a very hot day; and the workman who was already suffering from heart disease fell down while on work. Following this he died.

4. The object behind the legislation being protection to the weaker section with a view to do social justice, the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted liberally, so that other things being equal, the leaning of the court has to be towards the person for whose benefit the legislation is made. Bearing this principle in mind, the expression 'accident' found in sub-section (1) of S.3 of the Act has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed. In other words, the basic and indispensible ingredient of the accident is the unexpectation. In this case, the workman who was already suffering from heart disease, as disclosed by the oral evidence of the co-worker of the Ist respondent's husband, and Ext. WI Medical Certificate, when he was subjected to over-exertion, there was a sudden deterioration of his health which proved to be fatal. But for this over-exertion, which he was not able to bear in the state of health in which he was then, the death, following his fall while carrying the cashew boxes, would not have occurred. In this way, there is a casual connection between the employment and his death in the unexpected way This could certainly be considered to be an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which would entitle the dependent-legal heir to claim compensation.

5. The principles to be followed in deciding employer's liability for compensation for accident arising out of and in the course of employment have been well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Meckenzie v. I.M. Issak (AIR. 1970 SC. 1906), to which reference has been made in the order appealed again