The authority under S.33C(2) of the I.D. Act has the power to entertain claims for minimum wages, even if the claim under the Minimum Wages Act has become barred. The government's notification specifying unskilled workers and considering all others as skilled workers is valid.

1. The petitioner who is the employer challenges Ext. P4 order of the 2nd respondent, Labour Court, Ernakulam, made under S.33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (the "I D. Act") on the basis of an application filed by the employee, the 3rd respondent, claiming minimum wages at the rate applicable to a skilled worker.

2. The employee contended that being a Compositor she came within the category of "skilled workers" in terms of Ext. P1 notification issued by the Government in exercise of the power conferred by S 3 (1) (b) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Accepting her contention, the Labour Court found that "compositor" was not one of the specified "unskilled", workers and therefore such a person would come within the definition of "skilled workers", as the notification says that the skilled workers are "all workers other than specified as unskilled". On the basis of this finding the court ordered that the employee was entitled to a sum of Rs. 825/- as arrears of minimum wages computed at the rate applicable to skilled workers, viz. Rs. 160/-per month (vide Ext. P4).

3. Challenging Ext. P4 it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Labour Court made the order without jurisdiction. The reason for saying this is that the claim was made by the employee not before the forum provided under the Minimum Wages Act, but before the Labour Court under S.33C (2) of the I.D. Act. It is further contended that the Labour Court was approached by the employee after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act for approaching the competent authority under that Act. In support of this contention the petitioner relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur (AIR. 1979 SC. 1981) where the Bench composed of V. R. Krishna Iyer and R. S. Pathak JJ. held, in regard to an application claiming payment of gratuity, that it should have been filed under the Payment of Gratuity Act and not under S.33C (2) of the I D Act because the former provided a complete code for entertaining such claims. The court said that any error committed by an authority under that Act was capable of being corrected in appeal by the appropriate government or the Appellate Authority referred to under that Act. It is true that in a case where a separate self-contained machinery is specifically provided under a particular enactment, a claim based on the provisions of that enactment must ordinarily be made before the competent authority set up under that statute, and not under the general provisions of the I.D. Act. But where in a case, such as the present, a claim under the Minimum Wages Act bad become barred and the order is not made appealable to any higher authority under that Act, there is no taboo as such in law against an aggrieved employee approaching the authority invested with power under S.33C(2) of the I.D. Act. This is what the Supreme Court held as early as 1964 in Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva (AIR 1964 SC 752). A Bench consisting of P.B.Gajendragadkar, K. N Wanchoo and K C. Das Gupta, JJ. observed that, even where a claim was barred under the statute under which the amount was claimed, the authority under the I.D. Act had sufficient power under S.33C (2) to entertain the claim and do justice to the employee. That was a case of a claim in respect of amounts payable under the Payment of Wages Act. The technical objection based on limitation in terms of the provisions of Payment of Wages Act was ignored by the Supreme Court and it upheld the order made under S.33C(2) of the I.D. Act. The object of the legislature behind all these enactments is to do justice to the employees who legitimately contend that they are denied their due share. Apart from all these, it has to be stated that the objection as to jurisdiction was not raised before the Tribunal. It is for the first time that the objection has been taken in the present proceedings. For all these reasons I see no substance in the