The court held that court fee for cancellation of a decree or other document for property is to be computed on the market value of the property, not the value as shown in the document.

1. One of the reliefs sought for in the plaint is to set aside a sale deed dated 26-11-1977 in respect of an immovable property executed by the Ist defendant and his wife (since deceased) in favour of the 2nd defendant for Rs. 30,000/-. According to the plaintiff, the vendors had agreed to sell the said property to him tor Rs. 25,000/-. The plaintiff also seeks a decree for specific performance of the alleged agreement for sale in his favour; and in the alternative, claims a decree for refund of Rs. 9,700/- and for damages to the tune of 10,000/-. The plaintiff paid court fee on Rs. 25,000/- under S.40 and 42(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1959. The 2nd defendant contended (hat the relief of setting aside the sale deed has to be separately valued and court fee is leviable thereon for the market value of the property. This contention was upheld by the lower court. It directed the plaintiff to take out a Commission to ascertain the market value of the said property by depositing Rs. 300/- as Commissioner's remuneration. This order is challenged in this Revision Petition.

2. The material portion of the reference order is as follows:

"The Section itself does not use the words "market value", as in S.25. 27 and S.37(1). The first part of S.40(1) speaks of the "value of the subject-matter of the suit"; and if this means the value (or the market value) of the property disposed of, why is it that a deeming provision incorporated immediately after it? Deeming provisions are usually designed to create a fiction, and not to clarify what is otherwise clear. Is it not possible to read "value of the property for which the document was executed" as value shown in the document? Raman Nayar J. has attempted an answer in Uma Antherjanam (1966 KLT. 1046) but there is no reference to sub-sec. (2) which speaks of the "liability under" the document. And what is the approach to be made in interpreting a statute relating to court fee, if two constructions are possible?"

3. S.40 of the Court Fees Act, 1959 reads:

"40. Suits for cancellation of decrees etc. (1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed;

if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.

(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's share in any such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less.

Explanation.-A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed to be a suit to set aside a decree within the meaning of this section."

4. This Court has consistently taken the view that where the subject matter of the decree or other document sought to be cancelled is movable or immovable property other than money, court fee is to be computed on the market value of the property. See Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (1964 KLT. 895) and Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad (1966 KLT. 1046). In the latter case this court said:

"When the decree or other document is for property as distinguished from money it is the value (which in the absence of any indication to the contrary can mean only market value) of the property that counts, not the value as shown in the decree or other document. The second clause makes this clear-it is impossible to misread this clause as the petitioner would have misread