Tribunals, including Rent Control Courts, may possess inherent or residuary powers for effective administration of justice, especially in procedural matters, unless specifically denied by the statute or statutory rules.

1. The landlord was not present in Court when her eviction petition under Act 2/65 was taken up for trial, and the petition was dismissed for default. She applied for restoration and the Rent Control Court allowed the application, on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause to do so. The tenant appealed, but without success. His revision under S.20 fared the same fate. And that is how he has come to this Court, under S.115 CPC.

2. The question whether a Rent Control Court has power to restore a petition dismissed for default was considered by this Court in Asher v. Raru (1979 KLT. 260). The rival contentions were based on the provisions of S.23 of the Act. Clause (h) of S.23(1) confers on the Rent Control Court the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court in the matter of setting aside ex parte orders; and clause (k) ropes in the power of review also. Janaki Amma J. held that the power to restore was different from the power to set aside ex parte orders, and that clause (h) was not applicable. At the same time it was indicated that the power to review conferred by clause (k) could be used for restoring a petition dismissed for default.

3. Counsel for the revision petitioner suggests that the above approach requires reconsideration. The argument is that if the power under clause (h) of S.23(1) to set aside ex parte orders is not a substitute for the power under 0.9 R.9 CPC., the same must be said about the power of review under clause (k) also. The court's power under S.114 and 0.47 is distinct and different from the power under 0.9 R.9; and when S.23(1)(k) of the Act confers only one of these powers on the Rent Control Court, the other should be deemed to have been denied. A tribunal, it is said, can exercise only those powers specifically conferred by statute; and when the legislature has addressed itself to the question as to what powers of a civil court could be conferred on a Tribunal and has chosen to confer only a few of them, the others cannot be found to exist. No other decision has been cited; and if the power to restore were traceable solely to S.23 (1) (k), I would have bestowed more serious attention to the objection raised in the above form. But I think, as I will presently show, that an entirely different approach is possible.

4. We are today familiar with different kinds of tribunals appointed for different purposes and exercising different shades of power. There are tribunals for enquiry which merely collect data, and there are others which determine legal rights. Some exercise original jurisdiction while others enjoy appellate or revisional powers We hear of 'special tribunals', 'statutory tribunals', and 'administrative tribunals'; despite the difference in names many of them are adjudicatory bodies, pure and simple. They dispense 'administrative justice' doing exactly the same kind of work, in a specialised field, as ordinary courts of law, with the same degree of freedom from political pressure or official influence. In regard to this category at least, the proposition that a tribunal can exercise only those powers conferred by the statute creating it, has to be understood with caution, and its application limited to exercise of substantive powers, as distinct from matters which are purely procedural. The tendency of the English lawyer to deny wider powers to special tribunals has its origin in history. Memories of the Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts excited resentment in him; and the rule of law, as expounded by Dicey, appeared to many as the central feature of the British Constitution. It was felt that the powers exercised by politicians and officials must have a legitimate foundation, based on authority conferred by law and that the law itself should conform to certain minimum standards of justice, both substantive and procedural. The regular courts alone could be trusted with the power to affect individual liberty and rights, and the development of parallel adjudicating bodi