Judges : S.K.KADER
FOOD INSPECTOR, TRIVANDRUM - Appellant
Versus
DIVAKARAN - Respondent
Case No : Crl.A. No. 269 of 1979
Decided On : 01/29/1980
Advocates Appeared :
Public Prosecutor; For Appellant P. Sukumaran Nair; A.K. Chinnan; S. Soman; For Respondents
Food Adulteration - Accused acquitted on the ground of lack of evidence of unfitness for human consumption - Appeal against acquittal - Interpretation of S.2(1)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act - Disjunctive reading of clauses under S.2(1)(f) - Decision in State of Kerala v. Subramonian overruled - Benefit of S.19(2) of the Act claimed by accused - Case remanded for fresh disposal
Fact of the Case:
The accused were tried for selling adulterated pea dhal, but were acquitted by the trial court due to lack of evidence of unfitness for human consumption.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the trial court erred in its interpretation of S.2(1)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and overruled the decision in State of Kerala v. Subramonian. The court also considered the benefit of S.19(2) claimed by the accused and remanded the case for fresh disposal.
Issues: Interpretation of S.2(1)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, benefit of S.19(2) claimed by accused, adequacy of evidence
Ratio Decidendi: The court overruled the decision in State of Kerala v. Subramonian and held that the clauses under S.2(1)(f) should be read disjunctively. The court also considered the benefit of S.19(2) claimed by the accused.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the order of acquittal was set aside, and the case was remanded for fresh disposal.
1. The respondents herein, accused 1 and 2 respectively before the court below, tried on a complaint filed by the Food Inspector, Trivandrum Circle (Pw. I) alleging that on February 17,1978 at about 2. p.m. when pw.1 visited the shop belonging to the first accused, the second accused, salesman in the shop, sold 750 grams of Pea dhal which on analysis, was found to be adulterated and that the accused thereby committed offences punishable under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with S.7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, hereinafter called the Act.
2. In denying their guilt, the accused contended that they purchased the pea dhal in question from the shop of Sri. S. Pottivelu as per Ex. Dl cash bill and therefore they have not committed any offence as alleged.
3. There was no witness examined on the side of the accused.
4. The trial court relying on a decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Subramonian (ILR. 1978(2) Ker. p. 55:1978 KLT.242) acquitted the accused persons on the sole ground that there was no evidence either oral or documentary to show that the pea dhal purchased by Pw.l was unfit for human consumption.
5. This order of acquittal is attacked by the learned Public Prosecutor who submitted that the trial court has not properly understood the scope and effect of the decision referred to and relied on by it; that the Magistrate has seriously erred in not even looking into the charge framed by himself against the accused persons; that no charge has been framed against the accused persons under S.2(1)(a)(f) of the Act; that this is a case where standard has been prescribed for pea dhal under the Rules; that the Public Analyst has found that the sample did not conform to the standard prescribed and that therefore S.2(1)(a)(f) has no application to this case at all and the order of acquittal is clearly wrong and has to be set aside.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor is right in his submission that the decision referred to and relied on by the trial court applied only to a case where the charge against the accused person was that he sold an article of food which was adulterated within the meaning of S.2(1)(f) of the Act. This decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The report of the Public Analyst shows that the pea dhal purchased by Pw.l from the second accused did not conform to the standard prescribed. Admittedly no charge under S.2(1)(f) of the Act has been framed against the accused persons in this case and pea dhal comes under the category of food grains for which a standard has been prescribed under the Rules framed under the Act. While construing and interpreting sub-clause (f) of S.2(1) of the Act, in State of Kerala v. Subramonian (ILR.1978 (2) Ker. 55:1978 KLT. 242) this Court largely relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Kacheroo Mal (1976 (2) SCR. 1). In a recent authoritative pronouncement, a different construction was put on sub-clause (f) of S.2(1) by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatta (Crl. Appeal No. 195 of 1973: 1980 KLT. Short Notes 1). Distinguishing the decision in Kacheroo Mal's case (1976 (2) SCR. 1), it was held in the above case that on the plain language of the definition section, it is quite apparent that the words 'or is otherwise unfit for human consumption' are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them and that the last clause 'or is otherwise unfit for human consumption' is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered by or squarely falling within the clauses preceding it. In other words, the various clauses under sub-clause (f) of S.2(1) should be read disjunctively and the mere proof of the article of food being filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or insect infested would be per se sufficient to bring the case within the meaning of adulterated as defined in sub-clause (f) of S.2(1) and it would not be necessary in such cases to prove further that the article
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