The powers of the revisional court under the Act and its relation to the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as the limitations of exercising jurisdiction under S.115 CPC, were the central legal points established in the judgment.

1. This civil revision petition arises in proceedings under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, (Act 2 of 1965) hereinafter called the Act, for evicting the revision petitioner-tenant from the petition schedule building on the ground that the landlord needs the building bona fide for her own occupation. The. Rent Control Court dismissed the landlord's petition for eviction. Thereupon, the landlord filed an appeal before the Sub Court, Trivandrum as B.R.C.A. No. 119 of 1976. The appellate court, going into the merits of the controversy in detail, did not agree with the order of the Rent Control Court. The appeal was allowed and the landlord's prayer for eviction was granted.

2. This led to the revision petitioner filing a revision petition before the District Court under the Act as R.C.R.P. No. 82 of 1978. The revision was posted to 12101978 for return of notice and for hearing. On that day, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present. The respondent was also absent. The District Court dismissed the petition for default. The revision petitioner therefore filed an application before that Court for setting aside the ex parte order and for restoring the revision to file explaining the reason for the absence of himself and the counsel at the time of hearing. This application was rejected by the revisional court stating that it has no power for restoring the application dismissed for default. The Court said:

"S. 23 of the Rent Control Act alone need be looked into here. S.23(h) does not deal with restoration of petitions dismissed for default. It deals with setting aside exparte orders. A provision similar to that contained in O.9 R.4 CPC. does not find a place in S.23. Nor is S.151 of the CPC. made applicable to a proceeding under the Rent Control Act. Hence, since there is no provision to restore an application dismissed for default, I hold that this petition is not maintainable."

3. I have no hesitation in holding that this order is clearly wrong. Under S.20 of the Act, in cases where the appellate authority empowered under S.18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit, This Court has held in Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583) that the decision rendered by the District Court is liable to be revised by the High Court under S.115 CPC. The District Judge is acting not as a persona designata. The matter comes to the District Court in the hierarchy of the civil courts. If that be so, then all the powers of the District Court as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, could be exercised by that court in hearing the revision. This will be in accordance with the well settled principle of law succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L. C. in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General (1913) AC 546 in these terms:

"When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches."

The same view was expressed by the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR. 1948 P. C. 12) where it was said:

"Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal ties if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."

The observations in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikan