The interpretation of the term 'reasonably sufficient for his requirements' under S.11(4)(iii) of Act 2/65 and the crucial date for determining sufficiency were the central legal points established in the judgment.

1. Landlord in rent control proceedings is the revision petitioner. A shop room was let out to the Ist respondent tenant in 1961 apparently for the purpose of carrying on business in aluminium/brass/copper vessels. The petition for eviction was filed in 1975, and by this time the tenant had proposed and expanded his business. He had put up a three (or four) storeyed building very near the shop room in question, and had obtained possession of some other premises also. The Rent Control Court found that apart from the multi-storeyed structure where the tenant was carrying on business in the name and style of "Ambadan Vessels Palace", he was in possession of two other buildings or rooms in the same municipality, besides godowns attached to his residence, and a factory building near the Railway over-bridge. Analysing the Commission reports (Exts Cl and C2), the evidence of the Commissioner and the admissions made by the tenant himself as C. P. W. I, the court came to the conclusion that the business as such was actually being carried on from the ground floor of the "Palace", and that the shop room in question was being used only for storage purposes. Thus it held that the tenant was in possession of a building "reasonably sufficient for his requirements" within the meaning of S.11 (4)(iii) of Act 2/65 and on that ground, ordered eviction.

2. The Appellate Authority however took a different view. It relied on two circumstances noticed by the Commissioner, Viz.,

(i) the wall of the shop room in question was painted blue; and (ii) aluminium vessels were seen hung from the ceiling; to infer that the room was not being used for storage, but for "display of articles". A stray sentence in Ext. C2 also indicated that the tenant was using both the ground floor of the place and the shop room in question for carrying on trade. Adverting to these and other circumstances, the Appellate Authority held that the tenant's expanded business could not be carried on without the disputed shop room also. Godowns, factory, storage rooms and display facilities were all necessary for a business of the type and magnitude the tenant was carrying on, and if possession of the shop room were to be given up the rest of the accommodation would not be reasonably sufficient. The authority set aside the Rent Controller's order on the above basis, and dismissed the petition for eviction.

3. On revision under S.20, the learned District Judge more or less agreed with the approach made by the Appellate Authority. It thought that even when the tenant had commenced his business in 1957 (or 1961) he was in occupation of two rooms belonging to the landlord. The ground floor of the palace and the shop room in question are the only two rooms now also available for trade; the other rooms and buildings are all taken up for manufacturing, storage and other purposes. The counter, the telephone, the weighing balance and other accessories for trade were all no doubt located in the ground floor of the palace; but sitting there, the tenant could see the vessels displayed in the disputed shop room and sell them by bringing them in whenever customers wanted to purchase them.

4. S.11 (4) (in) of the Act provides that a landlord could recover possession of building or room let out

"if the tenant already has in possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village."

There is no dispute that the multi-storeyed structure, the godown and the other rooms are all situated in the same town; and there is also no dispute that while the plinth area of the shop room is about 518 sq. feet, the plinth area of each of the three floors in the "Palace" alone is 574 sq. feet.

5. The first contention of counsel for the petitioner landlord is that the Appellate Authority and the revisional court have both erred in construing S.11 (4) (iii). Obviously what they have taken into account for deciding