The main legal point established in the judgment is that the detention in civil prison is intended as a mode of enforcement of the injunction order and not as a penal measure. The court also emphasized the difference between detention and imprisonment and discussed the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 regarding civil contempt.

1. To quote the words of the learned Munsiff in the order under revision;

"The respondent-defendant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for two days in the civil prison."

The Court of the Munsiff has no powers to sentence a person to imprisonment even for two days. It is a penal power that is not to be exercised by the learned Munsiff. Evidently such exercise is the result of a wrong impression about the provisions under which he could act. The court does not indicate in its order under revision the authority by which he is sentencing the party to the suit to imprisonment.

2. The complaint before the learned Munsiff was that the defendant in the suit against whom there was an order of injunction in force during the pendency of the suit had violated such order The significant fact is that the violation was said to be in the year 1976 and the petition for taking action for such violation was moved by the plaintiff on 16-2-1978. The suit in which the injunction was sought was dismissed by the Munsiff on 25-2-1978. It was long after such dismissal and while such dismissal was in force that the court below passed the impugned order. It is therefore evident that at the time the order for imprisonment was passed there was no question of the defendant continuing to disobey any order of injunction since that had ceased to be in force on 25-2-1978. I am mentioning this to indicate that it was not as a measure to compel compliance with any order that the order for imprisonment was passed it was intended and intended only as a punishment for some past act of the defendant.

3. The powers of the Civil Court to take action for disobedience of order of injunction are contained in 0.21 R.32 of the Civil Procedure Code and O.39 R.2A of the Civil Procedure Code. O.21 R.32 deals, inter alia, with a case where a decree for injunction has been passed and the person who is bound by the decree wilfully fails to obey. In other words, that arises in a case where there is a decree which calls for enforcement. That is not the case here 0.39 R.2A deals with consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction passed not by the final decree in the suit but on an interlocutory application In case of disobedience of any injunction or other order made under R.1 or R.2 of 0.39 the Court granting the injunction or making the order or the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred is empowered to attach the property of the defaulting party and also to detain such party in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months Sub-rule (2) of R.2A indicates that the attachment itself is only for the purpose of compelling obedience, for it provides that the attachment shall not remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached could be sold. In other words, if the disobedience does not continue by the time one year has passed there is no adverse consequence to the party. Attachment automatically ceases. Therefore attachment would not operate as an expropriatory measure or as a penal measure. In that setting detention in civil prison must also be held to be not intended as a penal measure but as a mode of enforcement of the injunction order. That is so is indicated by the Supreme Court in the decision in The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR. 1961 SC. 221. In Para.23 of the judgment the court observes:

"Though undoubtedly proceedings under 0.39 R.2 of the Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order".

If the provision in 0.39 R.2A and the similar rule in 0.21 R.32 are intended to enable enforcement of the order or decree for injunction, as the case may be, there is no scope for invoking that rule when the order is no longer in force and by the decree in the suit the prayer for injunction stands