The court clarified the principles governing revisional jurisdiction of the superior court in relation to non-appealable final decisions of the subordinate courts and the consequences of its remand order.

1. Dissatisfied with the compensation paid on 27 41964 under S.10(d) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 read with S.51 of Electricity Act, 1910 the respondent on 1101969 made, an application before the lower court to determine that dispute under S.16(3) of the first mentioned statute. The revision petitioner, the Kerala State Electricity Board, contended that the application is barred by limitation under Art.137 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 1963 besides opposing the claim for enhancement. The lower court decided the question of limitation preliminarily on 3-1-1973 against the Board. Thereafter, on 8-8-1973 the lower court held that the respondent is entitled to Rs. 8,590/- more as compensation. The Board impugned both the findings in C.R.P. 109 of 1974. Without expressing any view on the merits on the question of limitation for the reason that the case has to be remanded on the other, this Court remitted back the case to the lower court. After remand the Board again raised both the points before the lower court. The lower court held that the Board is concluded by the order of 3-1-1973 on the first question, and again awarded Rs. 8,590/- as additional compensation. Hence this revision by the Board challenging both the findings, that is, on the question of limitation and as regards the quantum of compensation.

2. The contention that found favour with the lower court so far as the question of limitation is concerned is that the preliminary finding was not taken up in revision before the case was decided on 8-8-1973, and therefore that finding concludes the Board.

3. A party to a proceeding before a subordinate Court is not obliged to question every order passed therein before a superior court as and when the same is passed. He can, so far as very many orders are concerned, wait till the proceeding terminates and final decision is rendered therein, and when, on being aggrieved by the final decision, he challenges it before the superior court, also can canvass the correctness of any order passed by the subordinate Court, if the same has affected the final decision. Such are orders which constitute only a step towards the final decision or the final order and do not have the force of a decree: This is so, whether an appeal lies from such orders or not, provided if it is an appealable order, no appeal had been preferred therefrom. An order of remand from which an appeal lies is an exception to this rule. See Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. Bengal Government (1865) 7 Moo.Ind. App.283) and Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi (AIR. 1960 SC. 941). These principles find expression in S.105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 so far as appellate jurisdiction of the superior court is concerned, and in my view, these wholesome general principles would with much more force govern revisional jurisdiction of the superior court in relation to non-appealable final decisions of the subordinate courts.

4. A preliminary finding on an issue which turns out to be insufficient for final disposal of the proceeding is as much a necessary step towards its final disposal as when the same is sufficient for final disposal, for while in the latter case the proceeding is disposed of solely in accordance with the preliminary finding, in the former, the other issues are tried and decided because the final decision cannot be rested on the preliminary finding. The decision in Pichu Ayyangar v. Ramanuja (AIR. 1940 Mad. 756) supports the view that a preliminary finding entered can be challenged before the superior court in an appeal against the final order or decree. In that case the trial court over-ruled the defendant's preliminary objection that the court had no power to frame a scheme for which the suit had been instituted. The High Court in revision upheld this objection, and also dismissed the suit itself. Leach C.J. on behalf of the Division Bench held that the order in revision was only an interlocutory order falling under S.105 (1) of the Code, and the