The legal fiction arising from a Presidential Order must be limited to the purpose for which it is meant and cannot nullify valid orders or proceedings.

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated 11th July, 1975 dismissing a criminal revision petition filed by the appellant before the High Court.

2. The point involved in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. The appellant was being prosecuted for offences under S.120-B, 420, 471 and 468 read with S.34, IPC., S.167 (72) of the Sea Customs Act and S.5 (2) read with S. S (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. At the time when the chargesheet was filed and the Special Judge took cognizance against the appellant sometime in October, 1970 the appellant ceased to be a public servant, and, therefore, no sanction under S.6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was obtained. It appears that in pursuance of a departmental enquiry held against the appellant he was charge-sheeted and ultimately dismissed by the appointing authority. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the President of India on 18-10-1967 against his removal from service.

3. After consulting the Union Public Service Commission the President by his order dated 25-9-1972 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Collector of Customs against the appellant. The order of the President further directed that the period of absence from 5-9-1967 till the date of reinstatement was to be treated as under suspension. The appeal appears to have been allowed by the President mainly on the ground that there was some defect in the charge-sheet served by the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority was directed to institute de novo proceedings against the appellant after rectifying the defect in the charge-sheet. While these proceedings before the President were going on, the trial against the appellant proceeded to its logical end and we now understand that evidence has already been led and the arguments have to be heard.

4. The appellant on being reinstated by the President filed an application before the Special Judge praying that all further proceedings be dropped in as much as the prosecution against the appellant was initiated in the absence of a proper and valid sanction having been obtained under S.6 of the Act. The Special Judge, however, rejected the petition as a result of which the appellant moved the High Court but was not successful there.

5. The only point raised by the appellant before the High Court as also before us was that in view of the order of the President reinstating the appellant retrospectively, the appellant must be deemed to be in service with effect from the date from which the departmental proceedings were started against him, and, therefore, he would be a public servant at the time when cognizance was taken by the special judge, and as no sanction under S.6 of the Act was obtained, the entire proceedings became void ab initio. Mr. Sorabjee appearing for the respondents has submitted that admittedly and factually at the point of time when the Special Judge took cognizance of the case on 14101970 the appellant having been dismissed from service was no longer a public servant, and, therefore, S.6 of the Act had no application. S.6 of the Act runs thus:

"6. (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under S.161 or S.164 of S.165 or the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) of S.5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction.

(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government or of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the author