Judges : T.CHANDRASEKHARA MENON
BALAKRISHNAN - Appellant
Versus
VELAYUDHAN - Respondent
Case No : C.R.P. No. 1609 of 1979-G
Decided On : 08/08/1979
Advocates Appeared :
K.S. Rajamony; A. Shahul Hameed; Siby Mathew; For Petitioner P. Sukumaran Nair; A.K. Chinnan; For Respondents
JURISDICTION - Interlocutory Applications - Interpretation of S.10 CPC
Fact of the Case:
The court was asked to determine if it had jurisdiction to pass an order on interlocutory applications for amendment of the plaint and appointment of a receiver due to a stay of the suit under S.10 CPC. The petitioner, the first defendant, challenged the decision of the court below.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that under S.10 CPC, a court can make interlocutory orders such as orders for a Receiver, injunction, or attachment before judgment, without contravening the provision. The court dismissed the civil revision petition, stating that it found no error in the view taken by the court below.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to pass an order on interlocutory applications when the suit was stayed under S.10 CPC.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents from various High Courts and the Supreme Court to interpret S.10 CPC, emphasizing that interlocutory orders do not constitute a trial of the suit and therefore do not contravene the provision.
Final Decision: The civil revision petition was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.
1. The only question that arises in this civil revision petition is whether a court has jurisdiction to pass an order on an interlocutory application in this case two interlocutory applications filed for amendment of the plaint and for the appointment of a receiver because of the stay of the filing of the suit under S.10 CPC. The court below held that the court has jurisdiction to pass order on such application. The petitioner who is the first defendant in the suit questions that decision.
2. S.10 CPC. states that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties etc. The question here is whether it could be said that in passing an order on an interlocutory application, the court would be proceeding with the trial of the suit.
3. In Senaji Kapur chand and others v. Pannaji Devichand AIR. 1922 Bom. 276. a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court said:
"But under S.10 it is provided that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any 'suit' in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. That does not prevent the Court from making interlocutory orders, such as orders for a Receiver, or an injunction, or, as in this case, an order for attachment before judgment."
The Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kulsumum Nisan v. Mohammad Farooq & others (AIR. 1969 All. 479) also takes the same view. The learned judge said in that case:
"The object Underlying the provisions of S.10 CPC. is to prevent simultaneous trial of the two suits in which the matter in issue between the parties is directly and substantially the same. An interlocutory order in the nature of issue of injunction, or appointment of a receiver or an order of attachment before judgment cannot be regarded
'as a matter affecting the trial of the suit. - It seems to me that the question as to whether a party should or should not be impleaded does not encroach on the merits of the controversy between the parties. It is a matter of a formal nature and cannot in any way determine their respective rights."
In that case some reliance had been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh AIR. 1957 S.C. 444 wherein it was observed that'trial' was used as meaning the entire proceedings before the tribunal from the time when the petition was transferred to it under S.86 of the Representation of the People Act until the pronouncement of the award. In the Supreme Court case the question turned on the interpretation of S.83 as to whether the tribunal seized with the election petition was empowered to order amendment of the Petition under S.90(2) of the Act. Before the Supreme Court it was contended that S.90 (2) extends the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings before tribunals only in respect of procedure and that power to order amendment under Order VI, R.17 is not within the extension. The Supreme Court overruled the objection, holding that the provisions of Chapter III read as a whole clearly showed that 'trial' was used as meaning the entire proceedings before the tribunal from the time when the petition was transferred to it under S.86 until the pronouncement of the award. So far as the word 'trial' used in S.88 (3) of the Representation of the People Act is concerned, it was construed by the Supreme Court in the context of the various provisions contained in Chapter III of the said Act and the analogy could not be extended to a suit which has been stayed under S.10 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. The same view has been taken in regard to passing interlocutory orders by the Mysore High Court in Baburao Vithalrao Sulunke v. Kadarappa Prasappa Dabbannavar and another AIR. 1974 Mysore 63. In the decision of the Lahore High Court in Fakir Singh v. Secretary of State AIR. 1928 Lahore 751 it had been held that once a court has mad
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