The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'resides in India' under the Indian Divorce Act, emphasizing the intention to remain in a place for an indefinite period. The judgment also highlights the burden of proof on the wife regarding impotency and the absence of cooperation from the husband in providing medical evidence.

1. The parties to this appeal are a wife and husband governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The parties are Christians. They were married on 22-6-1968. The marriage was solemnized at St. Thomas Catholic Church, Payippad in Changanacherry Taluk, Kerala State. According to the wife who is the petitioner in the petition for a decree of nullity of marriage there was no consummation of the marriage by sexual intercourse. The wife is said to have attempted her best to induce her husband to have such intercourse but at all times he had remained unresponsive. This is attributed to impotency of the husband. At the moment the husband and wife are both employed in the Persian Gulf Countries. But of course they are not living together though at one time they resided together even there. According to the wife, even while they so resided together the marriage was not consummated.

2. The plea that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage as also at the time of the institution of the proceedings is recognised in S.19 of the Indian Divorce Act as a valid plea in support of a petition for a decree declaring the marriage null and void. That provision is invoked by the petitioner in this case.

3. The husband entered appearance and contested the petition. He admitted that the marriage had taken place, but according to him it had been properly consummated, and he had sexual intercourse with his wife. The ground of impotency, it was said, was urged only as an excuse to support the petition. The petition itself was filed because of ill-feeling between the parties which arose due to certain circumstances. It was further contended by the husband that the petition itself was not maintainable as the petitioner was not a resident in India at the time of presentation of the petition.

4. Two questions arose for consideration by the District Court before which the petition was moved by the wife. Whether the petitioner was a resident in India at the time of filing the petition which is a necessary requisite for maintaining the petition and whether the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and on the date of institution of the suit were the questions that arose for decision by the court below. On the first of these the court found that the petitioner was living in the Gulf countries and it was on her return to her home here for temporary stay that she filed the petition. It was found by the court that the petitioner's temporary stay would not take the case within the meaning of the term 'resident in India' in S.2 of the Indian Divorce Act. In this view the petition was held to be not maintainable. The court also went into the merits and on that accepted the cases of the petitioner that the husband was impotent. In view of the finding on the question of maintainability of the petition, the petition was dismissed. This appeal is by the wife against that judgment.

5. S.3 of the Indian Divorce Act which is the interpretation clause defines a District Court to mean

"in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together."

There is no case that the husband and wife did not last reside together within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Quilon and for that reason the petition is not maintainable before the District Court of Quilon. Therefore such a question does not arise for consideration in this case. S.2 of the Indian Divorce Act runs as follows:

"2. Extent of Act This Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Extent of power to grant relief generally Nothing hereinafter contained shall authorise any court to grant any relief under this Act except where the petitioner or respondent professes the Christian religion, and to make decrees of dissolution or to make decrees of dissolution of marriage except where the parties to the marri