The executing court has a duty to ensure that a valid ground for eviction existed at the time of passing the order, and a compromise order for eviction is valid if it complies with the statutory requirements.

1. The executability of a compromise order for eviction passed by a Rent Control Court arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition. The petitioner was the landlord who filed O. P. (B.R.C.) No 238 of 1972, a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent before the Rent Control Court, Trivandrum. Pending this Civil Revision Petition, the petitioner died and additional petitioners 2 to 7 were impleaded. The petition for eviction was first opposed by the counter-petitioners-tenants, but later, the parties settled the matter and filed a compromise petition incorporating the terms of the compromise. As per the terms, the tenants-counter petitioners agreed to surrender possession of the building within one year from 19-12-1973. The tenants will be allowed to continue till that date on payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 30/-. The tenants also agreed that the arrears of rent already accrued will be paid within tour months from 19121973. A further term of the compromise was that in case any of the above terms of the compromise is violated, the landlord will have the right to evict them from the building on the expiry of one year from 19121973 in the same proceedings. The Rent Control Court heard the counsel on both sides and passed orders on the petition for eviction in terms of the compromise.

2. The tenants paid the arrears of rent as agreed to in the compromise petition, but did not vacate the building after the expiry of one year Thereupon, the landlord filed E. P. No. 55 of 1975 before the Munsiff 's Court, Trivandrum for getting vacant possession of the building. The tenants raised a contention that the compromise order for eviction is not an executable order. But the contention was rejected by the Rent Control Court and delivery was ordered. Against the above order of the learned Munsiff the second counter-petitioner tenant filed a revision before the District Court, Trivandrum as B.R.C. Revision No. 6 of 1976 It seems that the first counter-petitioner had by that time left this world. The learned District Judge allowed the revision, set aside the order of the learned Munsiff and dismissed the Execution Petition. In Para.8 of the order the learned District Judge has said:

"There is absolutely no material extrinsic or intrinsic to the compromise order on the basis of which the court could be satisfied as to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In this case the only ground on which eviction was claimed is that the tenant was in arrears of rent. Under the terms of the compromise that ground ceased to exist because the default in payment of rent was waived and the tenant was given time to pay the arrears, upto four months. The tenant has the statutory right to get an order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent vacated on deposit of such arrears. The tenant was allowed to continue in possession of the building for a further period of one year stipulating an enhanced rent of Rs. 30- per mensem. There was no express clause that the tenancy had been determined and time was granted by way of grace. The compromise only shows that the tenancy was revived or renewed on fresh terms. The Rent Control Court gets jurisdiction to older eviction of the tenant only on determination of the tenancy and when one of the statutory grounds exist. When under the terms of the compromise the tenancy is renewed and extended for a further period, there is no statutory right for the landlord to evict the tenant without determination of the tenancy on any one of the grounds provided under the statute. So, on the facts of the case it has to be held that when the Rent Control Court passed the order the court did not satisfy itself with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction as no such ground existed. The order thus entitles the landlord only to resort fresh proceedings for eviction and does not give the landlord the right to obtain delivery of the building in execution of that order."

The abov